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And it happened that while they were conversing and debating,  
Jesus himself drew near and walked with them, 
but their eyes were prevented from recognizing him. 
 (Luke 24: 15-16) 
 
Introduction and methodology 
A major cultural transformation process is taking place in Chile.  Along with the process 
of modern and neoliberal reforms of recent decades its society has moved from a traditional 
community to a modern society.  Chile used to be a Catholic, conservative, hierarchical and 
homogeneous community, cohesive by close forms of sociability such as the neighborhood, labor 
unions, political parties and the Church.  In the last decades this community has transitioned to a 
modern society in the following ways:  by promoting the individual freedom and autonomy of its 
members;  by promising and extending material prosperity transversally through consumption;  
by and expanding a rights regime;  by legitimizing the public sphere as a supposed neutral 
meeting place for the plurality of life forms and convictions;  and by developing a democratic 
political system linked mainly by exchange interactions, which finds its best expression in the 
universal free vote and the market. 
Despite the fact that the Chilean turn towards neoliberalism is presented only as a change 
in the political and economic model, this turn represents an ideal of civilization around certain 
values that would configure the human being and his/her social imaginary1:  the dissolution of 
all forms of social solidarity in favor of individual effort, private property, technical and 
economic reduction of political problems, personal responsibility, family values and socialization 
through consumption..  This paradigm maintains that human well-being can best be expanded by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 




security provision and free trade.  Its core values would be summarized in the defense of 
freedom and human dignity. 
Like in any neoliberal modernization process, Chilean society has experienced the traits 
of ambivalence related to it.  One of those aspects that attract attention has to do with the 
difference between the perception of satisfaction regarding the personal sphere and the public 
sphere.  Chileans say they experience a feeling of happiness and fulfillment when it comes to 
their personal, intimate and family life, to the extent that surveys show that more than 70% of 
those who live in Chile are happy with their personal life2.  But at the same time they declare 
with the same emphasis that they are upset with the institutions, they feel that public life is not 
worthwhile and that it is a source of bitterness and discomfort. 
A closer examination of these survey data reveals a deeper ambivalence from the point of 
view of subjectivity, showing that the Chilean culture have been incubating a silent crisis during 
decades.  Notwithstanding, the feeling of fullness regarding personal life, there is an individual 
and cultural malaise among young people.  On one hand, the meritocratic culture that 
modernizing processes offer and that is promoted in Chile –that is, the idea that people have the 
right to perceive resources and opportunities for the development of their lives according to their 
effort– has not yet reached to the entire population.  Despite the fact that the cohort of Chileans 
between 19 and 29 years of age is more equal than the older ones, Chile remains a segregated 
and structurally unequal country3.  Public and private institutions are far below what is needed 
from them and create the feeling of social deception.  Moreover, in the last decade, all the major 
national institutions have being affected by different forms of corruption creating a perception of 
power abuse, mistrust in the public sphere and widespread impunity4.  On the other hand, there is 




pursuit of success, the predominance of commercial relationships and the disappearance of forms 
of community socialization that offered deeper human connections and horizons of significance . 
These shifts, among other factors, are producing a deep emptiness and a lack of meaning 
and hope among young people.  It is striking that the same country that according to the latest 
UNDP5 research can offer the highest levels of human development opportunities in Latin 
America (measured through the expectation of education, life and participation in national 
income) is the one that, since October 2019, has witnessed one of the largest social protests after 
the dictatorship6, one that is led by young people who demand a more dignified meaningful life.  
It is also shocking that Chile leads the sustained increase in the suicide rate among young people, 
who today, perhaps more than ever, yearn for a more fulfilling and humanizing way of life7. 
What are the fundamental features of our historical situation that they can shed some light 
upon this deeply ambivalent, and often contradictory, dynamic?  What is operating behind the 
scene so that we can understand the current crossroads?  Does the Christian faith tradition have 
something to say and propose to this current way of interpreting and living human history?  
Young Chileans continue seeking some form of transcendence in their lives, but often do not feel 
understood or inspired by Christianity.  Today fewer than 38% of Chilean youth recognize 
themselves as part of the Catholic Church and 41% as not part of any religion at all8.  The 
Chilean youth affirms that they experience the divorce between faith and science that occurs in 
university circles and the negative judgment against those who profess and practice a religion in 
those environments.  Moreover, they understand faith as an individual act and disengaged from 
an ecclesial institution which they distrust.  They perceive it and its hierarchy centered on power, 




them, that is not open to changes, and whose power, conscious and sexual abuses, crimes and 
cover-ups on behalf of the clergy are unacceptable and shameful9. 
However, these approaches do not quite explain the situation of the Christian faith among 
young Chileans, especially if one considers that the decline in Catholicism has been taking place 
slowly in Chile since the 1960s10.  Even during the late 1970s and the 1980s, when the Chilean 
Catholic Church enjoyed very high degree of prestige before civil society, the figures indicate 
that the number of people who identified with the Catholic Church gradually decreased. 
The Chilean Catholic Church has a long tradition of commitment to justice, human 
dignity, and the courageous defense of Human Rights and the construction of democracy.  Social 
Catholics were the ones who promoted labor unions to defend and promote the lives of workers 
since the end of the 19th century.  Chilean social Catholics started real estate corporations to 
build houses for those who were excluded from the cities when the Ministry of Housing did not 
exist (founded in 1965) or those who founded primary educational institutions for the children of 
the peasants who came to the cities.  In the same spirit, the Catholic hierarchy offered ecclesial 
land in the 1960s to initiate Agrarian Reform as a sign that a New Earth and a New Heaven was 
possible.  And in the darkest moments in the history of Chile, the Catholic Church was a refuge 
for the oppressed and the voice of the voiceless, literally giving its life for the people of Chile 
and for Jesus alive among the poorest11. 
In the decades of 1970-80s “the Catholic Church became a “Samaritan Church” willing 
to give a hand to all those who were left wounded in the way by the military[-civic] 
dictatorship12.  [It] assumed as its mission the [institutional] defense of the human rights of the 
people who were being persecuted by the State”13, with the express authorization and support of 




participation in its communities, the Church created different institutions to serve the victims of 
political violence and poverty.  With international support it founded savings cooperatives, banks 
with a social focus, schools and technical training centers, social housing factories, support 
institutions for migrants and peasants, and a center for the defense and promotion of human 
rights14.  With this institutional backing it organized through its parishes a “strong network of 
solidarity among the urban and rural poor”15.  Moreover, the Chilean bishops had a strong 
influence in creating the conditions of possibility for the return of democracy16.  “Thus, the 
Church entered into the 1990s as one of the most respected and trustworthy institutions in 
Chile”17;  nevertheless, it was not aware of the deep cultural change that was being incubated 
through neoliberal modernizing processes. 
As Chile inaugurated a new democratic cycle, expanded access to higher education, and 
consumption operated as a device for socialization, there was a big “change in the leadership of 
the Church [orchestrated from] the Vatican.  Conservative minded bishops replaced progressive 
bishops in almost all the dioceses.  Once democracy came back, these bishops considered that”18 
it was time to return to what they considered the “spiritual main mission”19 of the Church and 
they closed the institutions committed with Human Rights and social justice promotion.  “To the 
surprise of many, [the hierarchical Church discourse] took a radical conservative turn, and 
started to work in alliance with right-wing political parties, in the defense of what they called the 
agenda valórica (moral or values agenda), and remained mostly in silence about several political 
and social issues that were key to the recently recovered democracy”20.  In 1991 the new 
archbishop of Santiago, Carlos Oviedo, wrote a pastoral letter defending the thesis that Chile was 
going through a “morality crisis”, rooted in an unhealthy eroticism, “the loose sexual morals of 




Episcopal Conference and became the overarching discourse that allowed them to oppose all 
kinds of laws related to family and sexuality, from a more open sexual education in schools, and 
VIH prevention campaigns, to contraception, divorce, [sexual and gender diversity rights], and 
abortion.  Thus, the moral authority and privileged position that the Church gained in the Chilean 
society [due] to its defense of human rights and democracy, was [now] used politically for a 
completely different agenda”22.23 
This radical shift to conservative morals and politics accelerated the distancing process 
between the Church and the Chilean youth.  Its hierarchy continues “speaking from a position of 
moral authority that proved to be very useful to fight against a dictatorial regime, but was no 
longer politically adequate in a more pluralistic[, opened] and democratic society.  [Moreover], 
because this moral authority was used in a completely different direction, the Church discourse 
started to be perceived as an illegitimate and authoritarian intrusion in public [and personal life], 
losing its prophetic [spirit] and slowly drawing the Church into positions of institutional self-
defense [and survival], and moral and political irrelevance”24. 
Since 2010, this Church “had to confront one of its deepest crisis derived from the sexual, 
[power and conscious] abuse scandals”25 in all of its dioceses, “in all groups of clergy, including 
the progressive factions”26, and in all religious movements.  The indolence of the reaction of the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy, the suspicion of cover-up, the lack of guarantees in the investigation 
processes and the lack of measures of human, symbolic and economic reparation produced a 
profound break between the hierarchy, the People of God and the civil society27.  As a 
consequence, “the trust in the institutional Church has dramatically diminished and the 
secularization process has accelerated.  And the clergy’s moral authority, the main card that the 




influence, fell to the grounds”28.  Now, “the voice of the bishops and priests is hardly heard 
anymore, [particularly in youth settings, and the few] organized laity has serious problems to 
finds their place in this ecclesial and national culture”29. 
My claim is that beyond the data and these cultural and historical factors listed before, 
that have undoubtedly influenced and accelerated the Chilean secularization process, we are 
facing a great cultural tsunami that receives the name of neoliberal modernity, which involves 
transformation of the frame in which people think, feel and live, but that has not been considered 
with enough attention.  Tsunamis produce a wave that is not necessarily big, but that has a 
devastating force, that moves slowly and without stopping, changing everything in its path.  
There is no way back.  All we can do is try to recognize the new geography so that we can start 
rebuilding over it with the new and old materials that are useful for human life. 
The cultural change in Chile has been rapid and profound, like the passing of a tsunami.  
And the Christian community is just beginning to recognize this new spiritual and cultural 
landscape.  In this sense, the condition of possibility that this tradition can offer horizons of 
meaning and paths of fulfillment to the new generation of Chileans is a deeper understanding of, 
on one hand, the emerging modern subject, and on the other, what it means to live in a secular 
culture that has democratized education and consumption.  The intellectual effort of this thesis 
will show the blind spots both (1) of the modern subject who has silenced the question about 
his/her identity, generating a deep unease such as meaninglessness, and (2) of the believers 
community, whose obsession with issues of personal (and sometimes social) morality prevent 
them from seeing what it means to search for fullness in a culture that has silenced the language 




In order to see these blind spots, this thesis does a reception of a part of Charles Taylor’s 
project of self-understanding of modernity.  His proposal, as he himself has defined it –of a 
“philosophical anthropology of modernity” 30– will allow us to grasp the transcendental structure 
that all human beings, believers and non-believers, share in the current historical secular 
atmosphere.  In the first place, the constitutive orientation of the human being towards the good 
described in Sources of the Self, which has been forgotten by modern thought, making him/her 
blind and dumb when asked about his/her identity.  And secondly, this orientation that became 
the unwavering search for fullness in A Secular Age, from which Taylor infers that believers and 
non-believers, alike, are obligated to respond to a longing for transcendence within the immanent 
frame in which the modern subject lives31. 
 
Using the glasses from Charles Taylor’s toolbox 
Why have we resorted to Charles Taylor’s varied toolbox of thought?  Why use the wide 
range of lenses that your thinking offers to try to understand the longing for meaning and 
transcendence of the modern subject?  Do I have any positive predisposition to Taylor's thinking 
because of his theistic interpretation of human experience? 
In my interpretation Taylor’s global proposal revolves around two fundamental axes.  On 
the one hand, the formulation of an ontology that aims to account for the invariants that underlie 
human variability, such as orientation to good and the search for fullness.  And on the other 
hand, the articulation of a philosophical history, which in the case of Sources of the Self, sheds 
light on the controversial notion of “modernity”, thereby accounting for the constitutive 
historicity that is expressed in the various ways of being agent, human subject or person.  In A 




“secularization”.  Taylor does not remain in the usual political or sociological approaches, 
interested in determining the place that religion occupies in the public sphere.  Nor does he 
reduce his research to statistically defining the practices and mode of belief in our contemporary 
societies.  Rather, after taking a historical overview of the reformist transformations of Latin 
Christianity and the irruption of new social imageries that have created the conditions for 
exclusively humanistic alternatives to emerge, he sheds light on the conditions of possibility of 
belief and unbelief in our time 32. 
From Taylor’s double perspective, ontological and historical, this thesis concentrates on 
the first and in some analyzes of the current cultural moment.  As if the Canadian thinker gave us 
his hermeneutical microscope, we are going to look into the depths of the moral structure of 
human agent, to recognize that the modern subject is not an empty, self-referring, objectifying 
rationality, but a self who is structurally oriented towards a good that shapes his/her identity and 
that needs to be taught by others to narrate her/his life, to remember, to appropriate her/his 
corporeality, to conceive some type of transcendence (or total immanence), to relate to diversity, 
etc., and as we already said, seeking some kind of fullness for life. 
Likewise, we will borrow Taylor’s wide-angle lens to observe part of the twist of the 
1960s that allows, on the one hand, the emergence of the culture of authenticity whose main 
value is the possibility of choice on the part of the subject, very similar to what is happening 
today in Chile, and on the other, the consolidation of what our author calls the immanent frame.  
This frame constitutes the background of meaning in which our beliefs, whether we are believers 
or non-believers, develop, and where we seek to make contact with the sources of fullness of life 
that we embrace, whether immanent or transcendent.  Some experience this immanent and self-




others, the alternative of keeping their eyes open to the irruption of various versions of 
transcendence also arises.  Therefore, the study of the conditions of possibility of this opening to 
transcendence while living in an immanent frame, is an inescapable challenge if, as a religious 
tradition, we intend to offer horizons of meaning and experiences that give access to some kind 
of human fullness.  In this way, we will try, paraphrasing Wittgenstein, to help to show the fly 
the way out of the flycatcher bottle33 of modern meaninglessness. 
As we will show, the way out begins when the affirmation of ordinary life has a practical 
priority but not a metaphysical priority.  This affirmation, typical of modernity, is suspicious of 
any articulation of valuations that may undermine its goodness, silencing the question for the 
good, and of any teleology that indicates that more than life matters, clouding the search for 
human fulfillment.  In so doing, and paradoxically, it ends up weakening the affirmation of 
ordinary life threatened by lack of meaning. 
Likewise, we will show that one of the fundamental conditions of possibility for the 
Christian community to offer horizons of significance in the modern secular context is to recover 
the eschatological tension between the reality as we experience it and the full future that we hope 
for.  This eschatological vision offers ways of human fulfillment that must be freely chosen by 
the authentic subject, which is presented as a best provisional account of human affairs where the 
narrative of the subject’s own life is interpreted. 
Finally, we must indicate that Taylor’s hermeneutical position does not claim to be a 
neutral analysis.  He does not disguise his teleological interpretation of the human subject or hide 
his confessed hope and believing approach to the problem, for, as Taylor himself warns us, no 
one can offer an account that is “take”-free.  Notwithstanding, more importantly, we agree with 




kind of Christian position, opened to the dialogue and discussion with other takes34. In this sense, 
receiving Taylor’s thought is also a learning process of intellectual rigor and honesty. 
In a second stage after this thesis, we will need to articulate in greater depth the content 
of the tacit backgrounds on the subject and the world image that underlie our beliefs, as well as 
the history of the changes of the cosmological and social imagery of our time. 
 
1. The revolution of authenticity: cultural context for the search for 
meaning and fullness. 
In this first and brief section I am going to describe the cultural revolution that Taylor 
calls Age of Authenticity which has profoundly altered the conditions in which seeking for 
meaning and fullness unfolds.  This will allow us to put into perspective the blind spots that 
Taylor’s analysis has shown. 
The most evident expression of the Culture of Authenticity is what Taylor calls “an 
individuating revolution” that brings together three axes: a moral/spiritual, an instrumental and 
an “expressive” individualism35.  This arises from a broader critique of the buffered and 
disciplined modern subject, concerned above all with instrumental rational control, offering a 
conformist vision of the human being, which crushes individuality and creativity, excessively 
preoccupied with production, repressing feelings, spontaneity and imagination36. 
Starting from this, what has value for the human being today is understood in terms of 
individual self-fulfillment37, fueled by a powerful moral ideal38 behind it:  being true to oneself 
(in a specifically modern understanding of that term39), that is to say, being authentic40.  This 




their own pattern of life, to decide in conscious what convictions to espouse, to determine the 
shape of our lives in a whole host of ways that their ancestors couldn’t control,”42 whether for 
socio-cultural, ideological, religious or economic reasons.  Because if “everyone has a right”, 
increasingly defended by our legal systems, “to develop their own form of life grounded on their 
own sense of what is really important or of value”, nobody can be forced to adopt an identity that 
he/she does not want.  “People are called to upon to be true to themselves and to seek their own 
self-fulfillment.  What this consist of, each must, in the last instance, determine for him/herself.  
No one else can or should try to dictate its content”43.  However, as we shall examine further, 
this does not mean that the process of determining and choosing what is valuable excludes the 
presence and participation of others.  Those are rather degraded modes of self-fulfillment, 
because in fact, it requires them to be fulfilled.  For instance, the language and categories that we 
inherit to articulate about what kind of life appears credible or valuable44, the importance of 
recognition in the intimate and social planes that shapes one’s identity45, etc. 
Taylor outlines that the ethics of authenticity has two moral sources46.  On one side, it is 
part of the subjective turn of modern culture towards a new form of inwardness, in which we end 
up thinking of ourselves as beings endowed with inner depths, as Descartes and Locke showed.  
On the other, its precedent is the 18th century discovery that human beings are endowed with a 
moral sense, an intuitive feeling for understanding what is right and wrong, anchored in our 
feelings and not in a dry calculation of consequences (in particular those concerned with divine 
reward and punishment, as Locke defended).  Now “morality has, in a sense, a voice within”47 
that tells us what the right thing to do is48.  However, authenticity is developed out of a moral 
displacement.  On the original view, the inner voice was important to know what is right and 




feelings, takes on independent and crucial moral significance.  It comes to be something we have 
to attain to be true and full human beings”49.  Appropriating our life and breed an identity of our 
own, inevitably happens to learn to be in contact with our inner experiences, naming what others 
(people, experiences, encounters, circumstances, nature, etc.) cause on us, what we think and 
what we feel, listening to our inner voice.  The novelty is that if it was previously considered 
essential for a full life to be in contact with some moral source (such as the Idea of Good or 
God), now that source is deep within ourselves.  Nevertheless, this “doesn't exclude our being 
related to God or the Ideas;  it can be considered our proper way to them”50. 
In addition, Taylor explains that the importance and power of the being in contact with 
oneself increased after Herder’s principle of originality was introduced as a difference with 
moral significance:  “there is a certain way of being human that is my way.  I am called upon to 
live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone else’s”51.  Thus, “being true to myself 
means being true to my own originality, and that is something only I can articulate and discover.  
In articulating it, I am also defining myself.  I am realizing a potentiality that it is properly my 
own”52.  If I am not, I lose sight of the key to my life and what it means to be human to me.  And 
the danger of getting lost can be both due to pressures to adjust to external conformity and/or 
because by adopting an instrumental stance to myself, I may have lost the ability to hear this 
inner voice.  For, I can find the model to live only within myself.  “This is the background to the 
modern ideal of authenticity and the goals of self-fulfillment or self-realization in which it is 
usually couched, [including its most degraded or absurd forms].  This is the background that 
gives moral force to the culture of authenticity, […] what gives sense to the idea of “doing your 




What are the factors that led culture to adopt this moral and spiritual figure?  Taylor 
points out that one of the most significant processes is related to the consumer revolution.  In the 
case of Chile, from the 1990s onwards, the consolidation of neoliberal reforms expanded 
consumption and mediated relations through the market, which universalized access to material 
and symbolic goods.  The neoliberal post-90’s affluence and the diffusion of what many had 
considered luxuries before, produced a new concentration on private space with the means to fill 
it, attributed to personal effort and the new possibility of individual choice. 
To measure the magnitude of the change in the material conditions of Chileans, it is 
worth reviewing key data.  While the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita PPA in 1985 was 
only $1.444.-, in 2018 it reached almost $25.222.-54.  According to the United Nations 
Development Program, the per capita income of the poorest grew by 145% in the last fifteen 
years55, which made the members of the younger generations a little more equal to each other 
than those of the more old generations.  Access to higher education has been universalized56 and 
the consumption of durable goods has expanded and made accessible to the masses, while 
poverty has declined from almost half of the population in the early 1990s to 8,6% in 201957, if 
measured by income58, and a 20.7%59 if it is measured in a multidimensional way60.  The 
material conditions of existence have being enhanced substantially in key dimensions, either in 
terms of housing quality and access, household equipment, access to basic services or coverage 
of the educational or health system.  Likewise, neoliberal capitalist modernization transformed 
the public and private infrastructure of the country, extending the population’s perception of 
material welfare61.  
The objective perception of the fast material changes that used to take generations and the 




from the entrepreneurial world, the right-wing parties and the neoliberal culture, produced that 
historically excluded majorities attribute almost only to their own efforts the welfare they now 
have.  After this process it is very difficult for the old sources of authority that served as support 
for the more conservative customs continue to fulfill their role.  And the Church hierarchy is one 
of them. 
On the other hand, neoliberal policies in the work sphere and the technification of the 
countryside dismantled the relations of previously close-knit working-class or peasant 
communities.  People concentrated more on their own private lives, and that of their nuclear 
families, dissolving social ties and deteriorating primary groups of belonging, mutual help and 
collective reference (such as the neighborhood, the Church, unions or political parties). However, 
people are less willing to participate in the public and trust each other less and less, many 
continue to long for more meaningful community relationships and to live contributing to the 
well-being of everyone. 
The culture of consumption legitimized the idea “of “choice”, that is bare choice as a 
prime value, irrespective of what it is a choice between, or in what domain”62, which strengthens 
the possibility of having the right to freely choose the type of life and the identity (values, 
political, religious or sexual) we want to live as long as we respect the lives of others.  In this 
context, the search for meaning and fullness takes on a new and more immediate meaning, with a 
wide range of things available that were previously only available to the wealthy.  Young people 
acquired another individual awareness through consumption, the incentive to express personal 
taste and massive access to higher education63.  This scenario facilitated the emergence of a 
culture where “each one of us has his/her own way of realizing our humanity, and that it is 




imposed on us from outside, by society, or the previous generation, or religious or political 
authority”64. 
Notwithstanding, consumer culture and social media tend to be very ambivalent.  On the 
one hand, they offer a false sense of self-determination.  All kinds of merchandise become 
vehicles of individual expression, even of some kind of identity, but founded on rather aesthetic 
expressions that do not necessarily account for the values that shape one’s own identity and far-
reaching commitments.  This displaces in importance the sense of belonging to larger-scale 
collective groups (nations, churches, political parties, and movements around certain causes) and 
can trivialize difficult moral issues in the social and personal sphere, emptying values such as 
freedom, rights, respect, non-discrimination, etc.  On the other hand and paradoxically, the limits 
that a culture of respect, tolerance, freedom and mutual benefit require are relativized, when it 
comes to the search for individual fullness. 
In a context like the Chilean where to imagine one’s life and live in a way where meaning 
and significance can be constructed without any reference to the divine or transcendence, the 
culture of authenticity also affects religious experience65.  Our religious identity, as stated, “must 
not only be my choice, but it must speak to me, it must make sense in terms of my spiritual 
development as I understand it”.  This relativizes belonging to both a communal ecclesial or 
particular institutional framework, challenging a “monolithic authority” understood as a doctrinal 
frame that can lead off a spiritual inspiration “by the allegation that it doesn’t fit with some 
orthodoxy”66. 
Religious authenticity means that for many people “to set aside their own path in order to 
conform to some external authority just doesn’t seem comprehensible as a form of spiritual 




truth in any form;  “getting assent to some external formula is not the main thing, but being able 
to generate the moving insight into higher reality is what is important” 68.  Hence, following 
one’s own spiritual intuition is a priority over fit with some orthodoxy, incorporating plurality 
and a possible atomism in the religious experience and spirituality of our time. 
Likewise, tolerance is introduced as a relevant spiritual attitude, which also challenges 
the possibility of shared religious experience and community belonging.  As on the horizon of 
authenticity my spiritual path has to respect those of others, it exploits a diversity of individual 
spiritual pursuits (whether associated with nature, oriental meditation traditions, or some kind of 
historical commitment)69.  And in turn, the acceptance of various ways of living these searches is 
legitimized, whether they require a stable community to survive, or that they only have more lax 
affinity groups and only demand some advisory service.  This, added to the communication 
possibilities offered by technology, has the effect of broadening horizons but weakening 
community life and religious ritual.  Furthermore, in a context such as Latin America, where the 
experience of faith has been closely related to the possibility of prosperity and economic 
survival, rapid access to material goods and the emergence of new modes of production and 
consumption, it has also weakened the collective belongings.  Surveys show that religiosity has 
become more personal and individualized.  It is not that Chileans have suddenly become non-
believers:  it is that religiosity has diversified and has acquired a more “Protestant” dye but not 
necessarily belonging to an institutionalized religion70. 
These are the relevant features of the Age of Authenticity that we need to consider when 
trying to understand some of the contradictions of modernity such as lack of meaning, and the 
possibilities of the Christian believing community to offer horizons of significance.  Some 




will see in Taylor’s analysis of the current ethics of authenticity and of the malaise and 
contradictions of modernity, the source of discomfort does not have to do with the ideal of 
individual self-realization, but with recovering the deeper meaning of authenticity, which drives 
a self-realization that far from excluding unconditional relationships and moral demands beyond 
the self, it requires them in different ways to find a meaningful life. 
 
2. The silence that produces blindness:  no articulations for an authentic 
subject 
As the data on Chilean youth confirm, the preeminence of the lack of meaning or the loss 
of horizon is perhaps one of the features that could define our time71.  Taylor’s diagnosis is that 
this is due to a certain chill in the face of ethical deliberation and articulation of values and 
strong evaluations, on the suspicion that these could harbor a certain undue imposition of ends or 
lifestyles on people’s freedom and decision possibilities.  Or an attempt to homogenize a plural 
world, or a devaluation of everyday life based on higher forms of life that could be 
discriminatory or based on an illusion.  For this reason, supposedly in defense of freedom and the 
affirmation of ordinary life, modern morality proposes a supposedly objective, abstract and 
universal procedure to determine the correct obligatory action towards others, reducing moral 
issues of importance only to this dimension.  This mistrust in value accounts and qualitative 
distinctions with some ontological force, is supported by two aspects.  On the one hand, in the 
naturalistic, rationalist and empiricist currents inspired by modern natural science and its notion 




that, in defense of the demands of nature, the particularity that should not sacrifice inferior goods 
and expressive integrity, maintain that there is no reason to articulate and deliberate72. 
However, if moral issues are examined, it must be admitted that there are other issues that 
go beyond obligations to others.  For instance, there are questions that revolve around what 
makes our lives meaningful and fulfilling, or about the characteristics by which we think 
ourselves (or others) are dignified and worthy of respect73.  Other questions include respect for 
the life and integrity of others or the importance of well-being.  However, and responding to 
modern prejudice, Taylor shows that these three axes of morality are considered only through the 
articulation of moral intuitions and value distinctions that he will call strong evaluations74.  As 
we will explain, this articulation depends upon frameworks, which are themselves formed by the 
qualitative distinctions offered by the meaning backgrounds or horizons of significance on which 
these evaluations are based.  These cannot be manufactured from scratch but are received in 
shared linguistic networks since the moral structure of the human being is dialogical.  
Furthermore, this structure is open to a space of moral sources where a transaction occurs 
between us, others and the world, offering more integrative modes of authenticity.  Therefore, we 
will show that without such articulation of qualitative distinctions, what is put in check is the 
possibility of answering what gives meaning to and how to live our lives, that is, our identity. 
Furthermore, Taylor’s cultural and historical hermeneutical analysis searches behind our 
values for the image of humanity that naturally support and encourage them.  His claim is that 
what we value is intrinsically related with what we believe about human beings and the world, 
that is, with the kind of narrative in which we make sense of our lives.  Nevertheless, current 
dominant modern moral philosophies tends to obscure the connection between senses of the self 




than on what it is good to be.  In this sense a liberal society “is one that as a society adopts no 
particular substantive view about the ends of life.  The society is, rather, united around a strong 
procedural commitment to treat people with equal respect”75. 
This position leaves no conceptual margin for the notion of good as the object of our love 
or fidelity, and no room for the question about the attempt to live the best possible life76.  Instead, 
Taylor vindicates the intrinsic relation between self and moral, revealing the eclipsed place that 
the good has in the modern identity.  He seeks to bring out and examine those richer 
backgrounds languages of our spiritual nature and predicament, that lies behind some of the 
moral and spiritual intuitions of today’s people, ignored as confusing and irrelevant by 
contemporary philosophy, and in which we set the basis and point of the moral obligations we 
acknowledge, but more importantly, what makes life worth living. 
Given this, Taylor turns on the alarms, for he will reveal that for today’s human being it 
is not so clear how we can and should think of ourselves as subjects who have –or do not have– a 
sense of what is important to us, what we should be responsible for and what is valuable.  In this 
respect, this sense of human moral identity is not fully explicit for the majority of us since it is 
not primarily a set of well-formulated beliefs but values related to some picture rather than other 
of what human beings are, or in Taylor’s concepts, to certain conception of the human agent. 
In Sources of the Self and in particular in The Ethics of Authenticity77 Taylor attempts a 
critical analysis of the malaise of modernity as the current narrative, through what he calls an 
effort to recover those forgotten moral sources of the human agent.  Sources that modern 
philosophy would not have adequately understood and whose omission not only weakens that 
philosophy but also modern society itself.  The moral and political philosophy of modernity –




way from our practical argumentation practices in everyday life, from the value frameworks in 
which we constitute our identity and from the moral sources, that they would be leaving us blind 
and dumb.  On the one hand, this blindness leaves us unable to explain to ourselves who we are, 
and on the other, unable to address the problems and malaises we actually have.  Paradoxically, a 
culture like the modern one, whose science and its technical applications have managed to 
conquer the macro and micro material world, transforming it and putting it at the service of the 
human being, has not made it possible for the human being to know firmly who he/she is and 
what it is about to be a human and to be human within and with others in the limits of nature.  
Faced with the question, “who are you?”, the modern subject seems not to be able but to remain 
silent. 
 
2.1  The moral and epistemological reasons for a modern spell 
There are epistemological and moral motives that have somehow bewitched the 
contemporary human being, silencing qualitative distinctions and substantive articulations about 
good in moral thought and judgment, since it classifies them as irrelevant or harmful.  This 
inarticulation is what paralyzes the modern subject, making him/her blind in the moral sphere (in 
the strong sense).  But, why is the naturalistic and rationalist model so attractive to our 
contemporaries?  What is this model trying to explain but fails?  And if it fails, why isn't it 
abandoned as a model?  We will try to address these issues. 
At the epistemological level, there is wide acceptance of modern naturalistic or 
subjectivist epistemological arguments.  First, naturalism comprehends the human with the same 
molds of the scientific model of the prestigious natural sciences born in the 17th century, 




accentuates the capacity that impartial subjects would possess to revise their conceptions of the 
good or to decide between alternative conceptions of the good when the given priority of any of 
them is not recognized.  Naturalism thus postulates impartiality as the way to face moral 
pluralism and the way to resolve moral conflicts.  As no morality can be imposed in the public 
sphere, procedural and non-substantive modes of solution to pluralism emerge. 
Second, the goods or “values” are understood as projections in a morally neutral world, 
so values are not part of the content of things, that is, they are not part of reality78.  Something 
like substantive ideas about the good that we can know through the use of our reason would be a 
Platonic epistemological illusion.  In turn, the reasoning of modern natural science is 
extrapolated into practical reasoning, assuming a neutral and objectifying position that tries to 
describe human affairs in external terms and not culturally conditioned.  These are some of the 
reasons why our world view, in terms of ‘value’ ended up being considered optional79.  Then, at 
the individual level for modern naturalist or subjectivist positions the task of considering a good 
life is irrelevant to morality;  qualitative distinctions would be useless since we only need to 
describe the content and set a criterion for mandatory actions with respect to others80.  In other 
words, as has been argued, moral thought pursues what is right to do and not what is good to 
be81. 
Third, inarticulation is justified through what Moore82 has called Hume’s naturalistic 
fallacy.  This considers reality (reductively) as the set of quantifiable, measurable and even 
verifiable facts.  On this reality, analytical and synthetic logical propositions are recognized.  The 
former have no need for verification, they are always true since they depend on the meaning of 
the terms involved (for example, “ice is water in a solid state”, or “salt is salty”).  The second 




the ethical propositions that emerge in this rigid scheme cannot be true or false, making an undue 
transition from propositions of fact to propositions of value or of duty.  According to Moore, a 
fallacy is incurred by confusing “good” with “the good”, passing from the thought that all the 
“x” elements (for example pleasure, desire) are good (which may be correct), to which the “x” 
elements are the good.  That is to say, a moral property is inferred from some natural property, 
not only identifying ‘good’ with a natural property, but with anyone who accompanies it.  Thus, 
“the good” is fallaciously equated with “what produces pleasure” or “what satisfies a desire”.  As 
Moore teaches, the fallacy consists in passing from an identity of extension (the objects to which 
it refers to) to one of intension (what it means).  And since the question “what is “the good”?” 
requires explanations, this fallacious position strengthens the inarticulation that impoverishes the 
value density of language even when, like him, we want to describe ways of being. 
Taylor teaches that after Hume’s naturalism many of the modern philosophies are equally 
inarticulate because they replace the substantive dimension of values and of the hierarchy of 
some over others, (incidentally, it is how they appear in everyday life when trying to make 
explicit the complexity of what we live in a dense evaluative language), by the procedures to 
resolve the conflicts between valuations of good, reducing the qualitative distinctions between 
these strong evaluations to a single consideration or basic reason, impoverishing moral thought.  
Hence, these inarticulate, procedural, and rationalist ethics focus only on the notion of justice 
and not of the good. 
The strength and survival of naturalism is due to, at least, two phenomena.  On the one 
hand, to the fact that it is articulated with a set of knowledge and practices that make it somehow 
“connatural” to the complexity of developed societies that induce formalism and the loss of 




And on the other hand, to the feeling of power and control that rational calculation gives.  As 
Taylor notes, even if it is a mirage to think that subjects can choose certain goods or norms 
outside substantive value horizons based on the strength of their argumentative rationality in 
procedural frameworks, this makes the attractiveness of liberal, naturalistic and rationalistic 
theories understandable.  But such a position suffers from the fallacy of simplification, which 
supposes a “discarnate self” and an objective rationality that should not take over history and that 
has an unlimited capacity for choice.  Furthermore, it is founded on the psychology of classical 
empiricism “according to which human agents possess the full capacity of choice as a given 
rather than as a potential which has to be developed”83.  Likewise, liberal atomism believes that 
the subject is not culturally conditioned, that she/he is capable of not being influenced by a given 
horizon of significance, and of being indifferent to values, to the articulation of strong 
evaluations in languages that express qualitative contrasts.  Therefore, this subject is located 
above the diversity of values and can choose between them.  Atomism, in addition, supposes a 
radical relativism and subjectivism.  The first holds that each person has their own values and 
that they cannot be argued about, since the values of another, as they belong to their vital choice, 
should not be questioned.  Moral subjectivism points out that reason cannot mediate moral 
disputes, since moral positions are based on the fact that each person has adopted them and not 
on reason or the nature of things.  Obviously this factor strengthens the aforementioned 
relativism. 
Taylor accuses the naturalistic and rationalist epistemology typical of modernity, of 
inducing a misunderstanding of the functioning and role (a) of language, (b) of practical 
rationality and (c) of the social sciences84, since it is blind against to the elements of self-




commitments that constitute human identity.  In Taylor’s approach, heir to contemporary 
hermeneutics, the interpretations that the human agent makes of himself, of the reasons for 
his/her action and of the question about meaning, are crossed by qualitative evaluations and 
weightings.  What Taylor will call the Best Account (BA) of our behavior (which we will explain 
later) requires that we overcome the naturalistic reduction.  Moreover, the reasons for a value 
preference can only take shape when they are expressed in a value and expressive language.  
Thus, this language is essential to understand the acts, motives and identity of the subject who 
performs and formulates them.  But naturalism is unable to account for those hermeneutical 
features –expressive language, revealing evaluative contrasts, articulation of strong evaluations– 
which are the central elements when it comes to understanding the “meaning” that, as a question 
and as a problem, human beings we try to give into our lives85.  We will deepen on this later.  
As we said, the exclusion of qualitative distinctions and moral articulation to embrace 
modern naturalistic or subjectivist arguments is also founded on moral motives and not only in 
epistemological reasons.  Among these, Taylor highlights:  (1) the modern notion of freedom and 
self-determination, (2) the affirmation of ordinary life against notions of superior life like 
contemplation or heroism or ascetic commitment, (3) the autonomy of the subject to determine 
his/her purposes without external interference, (4 ) the sense of practical benevolence of science 
to improve the condition of humanity, (5) the desire for a completely universal ethic and (6) 
justice, equal respect and universal benevolence86. 
Paradoxically, based on these hypergoods that modern moral philosophies deny as goods 
but embrace, they have concentrated on determining mandatory actions, mute the qualitative 
distinctions that expose the meaning of our moral actions, the way we evaluate our behaviors and 




modern idea of freedom arises the procedural conception of modern ethics –which judges the 
rationality of the agent by how he thinks and not by whether the result is substantively correct– 
unifying the field of morality around a only basic consideration and as opposed to a 
“substantive” notion of morality. 
In consequence, Taylor claims that the silence on practical argumentation, value 
frameworks and moral sources not only makes us blind and dumb in respect of our actions and 
therefore our identity, but makes every possible behavior, every practicable way of life, seems to 
be equally acceptable from the point of view of liberal impartiality.  The result is that in the end 
nothing has a value and everything becomes insignificant and futile, denying even the sense of 
authenticity, when on the contrary, our moral culture has been accumulating some value criteria 
according to which we say which lives are full and which bring frustration or failure.  For 
instance, as modern selves we are moved by universal justice and beneficence through science 
and technique, are particularly sensitive to the claims of equality, the value of the individual, feel 
the demands to freedom and self-rule as axiomatically justified, and put a very high priority on 
the avoidance of death and suffering as part of the affirmation of ordinary life87.  Nevertheless, 
both our public and individual morals have been left without articulation –a key concept for 
Taylor that we’ll continue to account for– and in this dislocation would be the main root of our 
modern moral and identity problems. 
As said, Taylor maintains a philosophical suspicion towards the epistemology of 
modernity expressed in his emphasis on the substantive of the moral dimension (of good versus 
duty and fairness, of value versus procedure) and his attempt is to recover what he judges should 
not have been lost in the modern philosophical revolution.  It is important to note that his 




various modernities –fruit of human creativity as he constantly recalls– that have been 
accumulating to make us what we are, do not have a way back.  In this respect, the diagnosis of 
the blindness and muteness of the moral state of our identity and of our modern culture is not 
resolved with a therapy that starts at the root.  Taylor is a thinker who critically defends the ideas 
and institutions that define modernity:  democracy, rights and freedoms, the impetus for 
tolerance and equality, etc., but in his work he tries to understand in-depth the changes that 
disturb us, avoiding misunderstanding what we can do about them.  In this sense, what he would 
like to recover is modernity in a new language for articulation of values and moral sources as he 
realizes that the value frameworks have a linguistic and social matrix, and they have an 
indispensable place shaping our personal and collective authentic identity as human beings.  
Simultaneously he is looking for a hypergood without demeaning ordinary life and without 
discrimination and intolerance, without any of the “various forms of social exclusion and 
domination […] built into the very definitions by which a hypergood perspective is 
constituted”88. 
 
3. Moral structure hermeneutics:  learning to speak in order to see from 
one’s identity 
3.1  There is no possibility of human life outside the frameworks 
What we might call Taylor’s ethics of articulation is sustained and inspired by his 
hermeneutical position on language.  This will allow him to propose a different type of 




Naturalism understands language as a designative set of signs that a subject uses to 
describe and manipulate the world, a conception that would have derived towards 
representationalist language notions.  These reduce meaning only to the observer’s perspective.  
For Taylor this is a reductive and instrumental conception of language that only understands it as 
something that operates between us and the objective world;  as something that we use to 
mediate the relationship between the subject and the objects. 
Faced with this position, Taylor understands language in articulatory terms, in a holistic 
and expressive way89.  In other words, language is understood as a means of meaning in which 
we are immersed and which constitutes us, and which, as we said, is essential to express and 
understand the acts, ends and identity of the subject.  Where is its articulating role captured? 
Taylor discovers that certain feelings referred to the subject form the basis of our understanding 
of the human.  Such feelings are constituted in certain articulations that we can consider 
interpretations, those that require language90.  Then, he expands this notion of articulation to 
address other fields of analysis of human behavior, in particular focusing on values as they 
appear in the strong evaluations.  In this sense, this enriched notion of linguistic articulation is 
more complex since it incorporates the cultural assumptions of interpretation and of strong 
evaluations. 
In this same hermeneutical horizon, Taylor opposes two types of evaluation of desires, 
one weak and one strong.  In the first one, associated with naturalism and classical forms of 
utilitarianism, the human being ponders the various types of desires that he has, calculating the 
consequences of realizing them.  In the second, based on the hermeneutics that he claims, the 
human being ponders them attending to some quality that is put into play in those desires.  This 




is necessary to specify what type of goods the action or desire refers to91.  That said, precision is 
carried out through different contrasts, such as those stated in those culturally dense terms.  
These contrasts establish a hierarchy based on the contents that in fact are valued in a culture and 
such contents are expressed in a set of contrasts that articulate evaluative languages.  Taylor 
insists that a strong evaluator (expressed in culturally dense terms and whose references are 
interwoven with a whole set of symbolic particular meanings of a given culture) operates at a 
greater “depth” than one who uses only weak evaluations, since he/she is able to give reasons for 
his/her motivation in a more evaluative articulated way92.  As we will develop further, the strong 
evaluation reaches its greatest strength when the subject is able to proceed to a radical valuation 
in which their behaviors and motivations can be subjected to a more in-depth criticism in those 
moments when the very meaning of life is go questioned.  This capacity for revision is associated 
with the subject who practices them in such way and according to Taylor, this radical valuation 
is ultimately a reflection on one’s identity:  in it the subject, proceeding to understand 
him/herself without imposing external criteria of valuation, takes his/her own life in his/her 
hands, and exercising strong self-determination, he/she takes responsibility for him/herself93.  We 
will go into these aspects below. 
The moral and spiritual intuitions or strong evaluations “involve discriminations of right 
or wrong, better or worse, higher or lower, which are not rendered valid by our own desires, 
inclinations, or choices, but rather stand independent of these and offer standards by which they 
can be judged”94.  These are sustained and articulated on a background of qualitative distinctions 
that give them meaning, to which we resort whenever we must account for the meaning of our 





However, moral intuitions vary from one culture to another, constituting different types 
of frameworks that incorporate the qualitative distinctions provided by the background, implicit 
–most of the time– or explicit, for our moral judgments, intuitions or reactions in any dimension.  
Hence, the frameworks also provide the contexts in which those reactions make sense96.  But in 
an increasingly plural culture, these frameworks have become problematic, since there is no 
longer one that is proposed as a common horizon where moral judgements and actions are 
intelligible to everyone, stressing the human being.  Before this new more pluralistic and 
disenchanted world, Taylor affirms that the search for a credible framework will be always the 
search for significance and end in life, the one found when articulating moral intuitions, the 
adequate meaningful expressions on which we sustain our options and decisions97. 
The urgency of helping to visualize these frameworks can be perceived when it is verified 
that it is not possible to act without them, although we do not perceive them because many times 
these are not conceptually formulated.  What happens is that everyone thinks and lives within a 
framework, with goods, qualitative distinctions and ends with which they live and die, with a 
sense that some actions or mode of life is incomparably higher than the others which are more 
readily available to us98.  For instance, the ethics of honor and heroism associated with a citizen 
who highly esteems an existence dedicated to public service and not only to the private sphere of 
economic well-being;  or the ethics of a life according to reason understood as an order of the 
soul in tune with the cosmos;  or as a disengaged-self capable of objectifying reality and that 
governs its desires and the tendency to excess, insatiability and conflict;  or a theistic ethic that 
includes a better life from the transformation of the will, to be turned into Good News for others, 




Although it is true that frameworks do not enjoy the same ontological strength as before, 
it is not possible to act without reference to one of them.  As Taylor argues, to inhabit the three 
axes of moral thinking –our sense of respect for and obligations to others, our understanding of 
what makes a full life,  and the characteristics by which we think of ourselves as worthy of 
respect or dignity– we necessarily do value distinctions from a certain framework.  It operates as 
a horizon of qualitative distinctions within which we live our lives and make sense of it;  
therefore it is not optional.  What is more, it is absolutely impossible to get rid of it.  These 
provide us with the background, implicit or explicit, for our judgments, intuitions or moral 
reactions.  In this sense, to articulate a framework is to explain what gives meaning to our moral 
responses, because in articulating we try to explain what we presuppose when we judge that a 
certain way of life is truly worth considering, or when we place our dignity on a certain 
achievement or define our moral obligations in a certain way. 
Taylor shows that these frameworks can only be explained from a certain moral ontology, 
so they are outside the scope of modern thought, which, inspired by the model of the natural 
sciences, suspects ontology due to a misperception about what the nature of the moral is.  For 
example, one of the ideas that has led contemporary philosophical thought to confusion is the 
modern affirmation of ordinary life –one of the modern translations of respect for the human 
being.  This thought is erroneously suspicious of qualitative distinctions that would undermine 
the goodness of ordinary life of production, reproduction, work and family.  This distinctions 
they would eclipse the dignity and value of everyday human desire and its satisfaction, with 
some superior activity such as contemplation, citizenship or heroic asceticism.  But as already 
shown, the naturalism or utilitarianism that could support this position does not realize that the 




way to discuss what kind of ordinary life can be better involves making explicit the frameworks 
and their qualitative distinctions, since the best is not something external that is imposed on the 
agent but a way of living ordinary life99.  Therefore, it is not that these are not rooted in a certain 
ontology, but that they are subject to variable human interpretations (subject to be discussed 
later). 
The seriousness of the matter can be weighed when we grasp that these frameworks are 
linked to the question of the identity of the human agent, that “as such it is the background 
against which our tastes and desires and opinions and aspirations make sense”100.  It is in modern 
plural culture where the dynamic and essential link between identity and a certain kind of 
orientation can be expressed in the moral space101.  Let us explain how they are related in a 
complementary way. 
On the one hand, the role of identity is to guide us, to provide us with the framework 
within which things make sense to us, by virtue of the qualitative distinctions it incorporates.  
Using Taylor’s spatial analogy, identity gives us the fundamental orientation, the place from 
which we respond, and thus allows us to define what is important to us and what is not.  Our 
identity defines the space of qualitative distinctions within which we live, make decisions and 
act102.  Thus, our identity offers frameworks that provide us with the horizon within which we 
know three things (among others):  (i) what things mean to us through strong qualitative 
distinctions within which we live;  (ii) with whom we deliberate about it;  (iii) where we are in 
relation to it. 
On the other hand, frameworks and their horizons of significance also constitute our 
identity, because to know who we are is to be oriented in the moral space towards a good, with 




perspective “my identity is defined by the commitments and identifications [like being Catholic, 
Anarchist, Palestine or Mapuche] which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to 
determine from case to case what it is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I 
endorse, or oppose.  In other words, my identity is somehow the horizon within which I am 
capable of taking a stand”103.  Thereby, one has an identity insofar as these things have a stable 
(although contingent and dynamic) significance within which it is possible to perceive certain 
vital possibilities as good and other and as bad or banal.  On the contrary, whoever loses that 
commitment or that identification is left adrift, because in a set of questions she/he no longer 
knows what the meaning for him/her of things is, because she/he has lost the framework or 
horizon within which things are perceived as good or bad.  This is what brings about an acute 
disorientation that we call “identity crisis”. 
Moreover, Taylor points out that our deep identity, in a historical sense, brings together in 
a complex way various commitments that may be universal and some particular identifications, 
in which some stand out more and give greater character to our identity.  In a non-historical 
sense, our identity in the strong sense is verified when I can be an interlocutor among others, that 
is, when I have my own point of view, a fundamental moral orientation from which to respond or 
play a role, or when I can speak by myself giving reason for my actions and options.  In this 
respect, using the same spatial analogy, we can say that our identity supposes finding a moral 
space, assuming the space that our framework tries to define as an ontological basis through 
strong evaluations or qualitative distinctions104.  What we sometimes lose sight of is that an 
identity not only always involves the question of a highly valued good, but that an identity is 
something to which one is faithful and cannot renounce.  In this sense, it is that identity provides 




distinctions it incorporates, things make sense to us.  In this way, being a self is a question of 
what and how much things matter to us, of taking a stand and of being able to articulate 
linguistically about it.  This is being a self in the strong sense:  it is being able to answer who we 
are105.  It is having your own identity;  and in this sense, “we are” a fundamental orientation that 
defines from where we respond with our life, “we are” the place where we situate ourselves with 
respect to the good.  Therefore, having a moral point of view understood ultimately as the 
orientation of our identity, that is to say, as the question of what kind of life is worth living, is 
not and cannot be optional.  What is at stake is our identity and therefore our freedom, that is, 
that there is a human subject in strong sense, capable of determining him/herself and giving 
account of it106. 
A naturalistic position (rationalist or utilitarian), which points out that it is possible to 
dispense with frameworks, is in serious difficulties to account for the possibility that there is a 
human subject, an interlocutor with their own identity expressed in qualitative distinctions about 
things that are significant for him or her.  And as I have pointed out, these are elaborated through 
a language of interpretation that one has accepted as a valid articulation of these questions.  
Being a self, a person, is not being an object of scientific study, but being constituted by self-
interpretations107 that we make about ourselves or of the meanings that things hold for us, which 
are never fully explicit  This does’t mean that we are totally transparent to ourselves either.  
However, we are constituted by a language in which we move to find an orientation to good. 
 
 3.2  The narrative identity of the human subject 
In this horizon we have described, Taylor points out that language has three functions108:  




“formulate things”109.  We articulate senses in a complex and dense way, making us aware of 
something.  Second “language serves to place some matter out in the open between 
interlocutors”110 generating a public space and opening, revealing what is expressed.  And the 
third allows us to articulate through language certain things, such as “our most important 
concerns, the characteristically human concerns111”, so that they impact us.  In addition, it must 
be considered that “a language only exists and is maintained within a language community, 
[what indicates that] one is a self only among other selves”112, and that one is described with 
reference to those who surround us.  This is a key point to address from Taylor's proposal, since 
there are two modern values that would apparently deny that reference:  the modern aspiration to 
freedom and the centrality of the individual, but as we will show, these do not contradict each 
other rather they require each other. 
Let’s see.  On the one hand, in an evolutionary sense, the languages of moral and spiritual 
discernment are learned through upbringing and are bred through shared speech.  Through our 
experiences with others we learn the meaning of what is love, anger, sadness, shame, justice or 
the aspiration to the whole, etc. and therefore also with others we learn valuations and 
judgments, which allows my own self-definition.  On the other hand, inasmuch as we open 
ourselves to other spaces of conversation, towards other places of “the common” or “the public”, 
these valuations and judgments mature and become appropriate as an original way of 
understanding myself and interpreting human life.  Consequently, the self only exists within 
some “interlocution websites”113 that are transposed, so it is not possible to be a self (in a strong 
sense) alone. 
Thus, the question about my identity, about who I am, is answered by (i) defining the 




within which my most important defining relationships exist.  That is, the question of the identity 
of a human agent includes her/his position in moral and spiritual questions oriented to a good, 
and also the reference to a defining community.  But both tend to be eclipsed by the conceptions 
of modern naturalism or rationalism, or by an ill-gotten authenticity in a type of narrow 
individualism that instrumentalizes others or that loses interest in the great concerns that go 
beyond the self (of political, historical or religious type). 
Even further, the reference to a defining, particular and historical community of 
belonging is not lost when tensions occur, such as when some subjects distance themselves from 
opinions that they judge to be dehumanizing114.  A human being can always be original but 
insofar as he is in relation –by opposition, criticism or improvement– with the language and 
vision of others.  Otherwise, if she/he loses that reference, she/he can get lost in confusion.  As 
Wittgenstein maintains, something like a language potentially invented by individuals privately 
is not possible.  The distinctions are not invented from scratch but arise through languages that 
we share with other agents in an essential way;  then, innovation, new meanings and new 
languages can only be elaborated through conversation, within a common language through 
exchange with whom one has a certain common understanding of what is at stake in such an 
undertaking115. 
Then, as we have said, my identity is shaped in the first place, by the definition of (i) the 
place from where I speak, that is, of the space of moral orientation or framework where I 
recognize certain goods.  Secondly, my identity is shaped by (ii) those with whom I speak about 
such goods.  Third, Taylor highlights that within the frameworks, the goods by which our moral 
and spiritual orientation is defined, and which we speak to significant others, are (iii) the same by 




linked.  The latter is related to knowing where we are in relation to the good and not just 
recognizing it in the moral space.  Let’s delve into this third aspect. 
The modern aspiration to the fullness of one’s life against a vain or empty life, has 
historical antecedents in the search for meaning and connection with a greater reality, not only in 
cosmic or religiously significant terms, but also of participation in important events in our 
history (political, natural, sports, entertainment or whatever).  This “contact” with a greater 
reality, using Taylor’s spatial analogy, is understood in different ways in contemporary culture 
depending on the good with respect to which a subject learns to move to be correctly located117.  
For instance, in relation to God it can be a relationship in sacramental terms, or prayer or action 
in history118.  For those who adhere to an ethic of honor, it is defined with respect to the 
proximity of the space of fame and the distance of that of shame.  For those who define good as 
self-control through reason, the image of fulfillment has to do with being able to order their lives 
and avoid being overwhelmed by the desire for inferior things.  For those who are moved by 
some form of affirmation of ordinary life, the most important thing is to ensure a good job and a 
good family.  For those who find the meaning of life in the possibilities offered by expression, 
they will seek to be able to realize it through some intellectual or artistic means or in the 
configuration of their lives.  As you can see, in all these typologies the crucial question is how 
far or how close we are to the good119. 
On the other hand, this notion of where we are located in the direction of our lives, has an 
unavoidable temporal dimension.  It evolves as we develop our most fundamental motivation or 
meet external limits, and thus, our lives are changing.  This allows Taylor to point out another 
basic feature of human existence:  we are always changing and becoming situated in time120, 




to the good121.  So when considering what defines our identity, (i) the orientation to the good and 
(ii) the others with whom we dialogue about it, they are not an optional matter, nor (iii) is the 
place where we situate ourselves in relation to the good.  The first is an absolute matter because 
there is no other option between these two:  we are or we are not in the direction of that good.  
But the latter is relative to the first:  because once in the direction of good, the question is 
whether we are closer or farther in the process of becoming.  Then, the question of our condition 
never depletes in what we are because we are always changing and becoming122. 
This allows Taylor to consider the narrative nature of our identity.  “In order to make a 
minimal sense of our lives [and] to have an identity, we need orientation to the good, which 
means some sense of qualitative discrimination, of the incomparably higher.  Now we see that 
this sense of the good has to be woven into my understanding of my life as an unfolding story.  
But this is to state another basic condition of making sense of ourselves, that we grasp our lives 
in a narrative, […and] making sense of one’s life as a story is also, as orientation to the good, 
not an optional extra;  that our lives exist also in this space of questions, which only a coherent 
narrative can answer.  In order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a notion of how 
we have become, and of where we are going”123.  In this sense, the human agent must grasp 
her/his life in a narrative that cannot be arbitrary or neutral and whose authenticity depends, not 
on a mere flash, but on the way or the path that he has followed to become a self as someone 
valuable or with a significant life124.  Therefore, as subjects we will not be fully human until we 
are able to say what it is that moves us, around what we build our lives and to narrate our history 
on how and where we are placing ourselves with respect to the good that we seek125.  And the 




community with which we cannot lose reference.  Only then do we know who we are.  Only in 
this way we have identity. 
 
 3.3  Authentic freedom 
Far from threatening freedom through his substantive proposal of human identity, Taylor 
seems to be recovering and reworking the difference and necessary complementarity (in tension) 
between negative freedom and positive freedom.  Negative freedom is that no one interferes with 
my actions.  “In this sense, political freedom is simply the area in which a human being can act 
without being hindered by others”126.  Instead, “the positive meaning of the word freedom 
derives from the individual’s desire to be his own owner.  I want my life and my decisions to 
depend on myself, and not on outside forces, whatever these are”127.  These are two modes of 
freedom that are at different levels and generally tend to be confused.  There is not necessarily an 
opposition between them;  on the contrary, the modern ideal of individual freedom demands its 
complement.  Negative freedom answers the question:  can you do what you want?  On the other 
hand, positive freedom refers us to the question:  can you choose the object of your love?  It is 
possible that a subject does not find interference to carry out what she/he wants and, despite this, 
lack the ability to choose the object of her/his will and to determine her/his own actions if it is 
still under the spell of modern morality that despises the articulation of the qualitative 
distinctions originally learned and appropriate in a reference community.  Obviously, there is 
also the possibility that a subject lacks negative freedom and, despite this, retains his free will128. 
Taylor calls positive freedom self-determining freedom, and distinguishes it from 
authenticity, because since they have been developed together they tend to be confused as well 




involves my finding the design of my life myself, against the demands of external conformity”130.  
But Taylor argues that authenticity cannot and should not always go hand in hand with self-
determined freedom, for the latter undermines itself.  On the one hand, freedom taken to the 
extreme does not recognize limits that it must respect, and on the other, it tends to abolish all 
horizons of significance, losing them and trivializing the situation of the human being, leaving 
him “alone in a silent universe, without intrinsic meaning, condemned to create value”131.  This 
produces a flattened world reinforcing the degraded and egocentric image of authenticity albeit 
more friendly, as it is taken as if it supports the demands for recognition of difference or 
diversity.  Additionally, self-determined freedom tends to eclipse the horizons of significance 
and its frameworks, and reduces significance to the possibility of choice, making human life an 
exercise in freedom even if meaning is lost or all moral sources fail.  This is the downfall of 
authenticity as it is only trapped in an anthropocentrism incapable of articulating value options 
and incapable of recognizing any difference both in itself and in others.  This means that there 
are no compelling reasons why some things should be more important than others. Therefore, by 
offering the horizon of freedom as an authentic identity, Taylor re-elaborates the difference and 
complementarity between the aforementioned freedoms132. 
This brief review together with the arguments that we will continue developing show how 
and why the modern idea of freedom, together with the affirmation of ordinary life –ideas that 
Taylor endorses but not this version– are two of the main reasons for the shift from the 
substantive to the procedural in morality.  They suppress the articulation of qualitative 
distinctions, which silences the constitutive goods that shape human identity.  These two 




confusions and reduce morale to actions due to other disregarding the question for the good 
life133. 
As we continue to delve further, Taylor will show that the external forces in which the 
subject dwells are not imposed from without, but are received and elaborated from within as a 
path to authenticity. 
 
3.4  Conceptual notions about the good 
Before continuing, we must delve into some more specific conceptual notions about the 
good (which we have only used so far in a general way) that Taylor uses to explain the primary 
place of qualitative distinctions in our life and moral thought and, consequently, the importance 
of their articulation134.  Obviously, his starting point is the moral and vital assets that he has been 
showing, those that only exist and become an option through a certain articulation in webs of 
language or interlocution. 
First, the “vital good”:  goods that define the qualitative distinctions between actions, 
desires, feelings or motivations and lifestyles;  they are facets or components of the good life.  
Second, the “intense good”:  actions, motivations, lifestyles that are considered qualitatively 
superior, incomparably superior than others in a qualitative distinction, which provide the point 
of view from which to weigh, judge and decide on these.  These intense goods, these higher 
order goods are called hypergoods, and generally involve a change and a rejection of previous 
goods135.  As we will explain later, for Taylor this status is precisely what defines “morals” in our 
culture.  Finally, from the perspective of certain moral phenomenology, Taylor points out that 




and that they configure the sources that we recognize as moral and that they have an “objective” 
force for subject.  For instance, the moral force of respect for life from the perspective of theism, 
for which life is a divine gift and the human being an image of God.  This type of moral 
considerations mobilized Christians in Chile to actively promote and defend Human Rights 
during the civic-military dictatorship during the 1970s and 80s.  The moral sources that 
configure these superior goods are designated by Taylor as a “constitutive good”:  good that, on 
the one hand, constitutes or defines what is a good action, defining the content of moral theory, 
and on the other, that good is also the strength or love that moves us to good action.  That is, that 
constitutive good defines and empowers.  For this reason the constitutive good is a moral source, 
something whose love or respect empowers us to do good and be good.  For instance, external 
constitutive goods such as the Idea of Good that sheds light to see other goods and make 
decisions dispassionately;  or the Agape to and from God which transforms us;  or the Exodus 
story as a path of liberation that draws an enormous moral force (in a transcendent or immanent 
sense).  Or internalized goods such as the dignity of one’s moral reason, or the courage to face 
the disenchanted world, the search for one’s own originality, etc. 
Taylor notes that in the first instance it does not matter if modern immanent humanism 
does not recognize a proper place for moral sources or constitutive goods, because although they 
are not recognized, there is still something that occupies that function, defining certain actions 
and motives as superior, and empowering the human agent to live in conformity with what is 
superior.  However, neglect of all knowledge of qualitative distinctions has caused this 
dimension of moral thought and experience to be abandoned.  For this reason, many do not know 
what to say when they must answer, for instance, what is what underpins the sense of respect for 




The understanding of the good as a moral source has also been silenced by the main 
strands of modern moral consciousness.  And although the articulation of these goods is difficult 
and problematic, particularly in plural contexts where diverse traditions coexist and where there 
are no languages or historical or symbolic references shared by all, it is not only important but 
essential.  The articulation of the constitutive goods or moral sources helps us to approach them, 
to clarify them, capturing what they include and mean for human life.  Those who recognize 
them can be moved to respect and love them in such a way that they receive their powerful moral 
force that enables them to live to their measure.  It is the force of language;  “words can 
empower, [...] words can at times have tremendous moral force”136.  Without any articulation we 
disconnect from the good and we could stop being a self or human beings in the strong sense, or 
be disoriented accompanied by great anguish. 
However, there are some reasons to mistrust the articulation of hypergoods or moral 
sources, as it can be a possible source of deception, typical of a word that is only the imitation of 
an authentic narrative that is used only to thicken our vanity or maintain the status quo, or 
because mixed with some historical falsehood it can be a place of escape that, by giving certain 
moral security, isolates us from the energy of true moral sources.  In addition, any articulation 
does not work:  some articulations could be dead and not exert any force on people. 
Taylor suggests that strength comes not only from the formulation, but from the entire act 
of discourse:  the most vigorous case is when the speaker, the formulation, and the act of 
delivering the message come together to reveal the good137.  The effective articulation releases 
force when it brings sources closer, clarifies them, and makes them accessible in all their 
inherent strength, in their ability to inspire good and mobilize by drawing us in.  This is how 




If it is true that our deepest identity is narrative, the unknown force that articulation 
reveals allows people to understand their lives through a history that is renewed and enriched, 
that re-founds, gives meaning and substance to their own life relating it to a greater narrative, a 
broader history as realization of the good138.  The strength of the sources articulates our feelings 
and our history, connecting us with that source (such as the struggle through the prism of the 
Exodus that the civil rights movement in the U.S. carried out).  The strength of certain histories 
is linked to the comprehension of our lives in the narrative as something that is related to the 
good. 
 
4. Towards a new ethical realism to come out of the bottle:  appellative 
realism 
In the previous section we have developed part of the analysis that Taylor offers for a 
better comprehension of the functioning and role of language, the social sciences and practical 
rationality to recover the vision of the self-interpretation of the human subject as a way of 
understanding human action and the vital commitments that are constituting her/his identity.  In 
this section we will delve into it with particular emphasis on practical rationality and the kind of 
ontological foundation for morality that Taylor discovers.  Let’s see. 
Taylor is opposed to a merely subjective character of values.  Nevertheless, the status of 
moral realism of such objective force does not have the character of a naive realism in the 
manner of the Platonic Ideas.  Although they do not have an independent existence from human 
beings, they do not depend on them either.  In other words, there is a recognition of the 




subject and his particular circumstance.  As Taylor’s hermeneutical analysis points out, we 
cannot dispense with the dimensions of value that stain all our judgments and descriptions.  In 
this respect, the “value terms are real features of our world”139 and the hierarchicalization of such 
terms is inherent to their recognition and to its articulation in the moral language by which, let us 
remember, we become moral subjects in a strong sense ourselves.  Therefore, as has been shown, 
our way of being must be understood as a historically and dynamically constructed identity, 
which places Taylor’s appellative realism140 of values somewhere between objectivist Platonism 
of values and naturalistic projectivism141. 
Taylor’s position is heir to hermeneutics and phenomenology.  He thinks that we can no 
longer be simple realists in our metaphysics or about hypergoods142.  Human beings are self-
interpreting beings, and consequently not Cartesianly transparent.  But neither are creative 
imaginations with any correspondence beyond the self.  Rather our self-interpretations are at 
their best when they are social143.  Taylor places the subject’s self-understanding, the possibility 
of meaning and meaning that shape their identity, in a space of transaction between the world 
and ourselves.  This inhabited space has different dimensions;  one of them enables the 
frameworks, the horizons of significance or backgrounds and their qualitative distinctions that 
allow, on the one hand, the articulation of hypergoods, and on the other (as we will see later) the 
recognition that we require from others to forge our identity, be given to us.  This inhabited 
space has different dimensions;  one of them allows us to be given the frameworks, the horizons 
of significance or backgrounds and their qualitative distinctions that allow both the articulation 
of hypergoods and the recognition of others (as we will see later) that we require to forge our 
identity.  This places us within a broader horizon where what comes from outside does not 




and appropriated.  Thus, what comes from outside does not impede freedom144, nor the 
affirmation of daily life nor the original expressiveness of the subject;  on the contrary, it is what 
drives them for a life with significance and meaning.  We will show the same with regard to the 
relationship of the human being with God and the life of the Gospel:  the relationship with a 
broader presence that does not limit but rather conveys, empowers and transforms the human 
being. 
But let’s return to our line of argument.  If appellative realism is taken seriously, it can 
break the spell that silences qualitative distinctions and substantive articulations and that blind us 
about our identity.  It shows that goods are part of the world but not as studied by the natural 
sciences.  Thence it is an unjustified leap to claim that they are therefore not real, nor objective, 
and not relative like any other part of the natural world145.  Therefore, it cannot be said a priori 
that human beings must be explained by a science as understood by modern natural science, as if 
they were an object or a part of a disenchanted universe that considers the goods that the human 
being intensely values as not real.  It is necessary to free oneself from the enchantment of the 
natural sciences and from Platonism that leaves the modern moral subject dumb and blind to 
examine and articulate moral goods. 
In this sense, to penetrate human affairs and thoroughly explain the question of what it is 
to live in the universe as a human being, we do not have a better measure of reality than the 
language of “goods” or “values”.  They are the ones that best allow us to understand and explain 
both our actions and feelings and those of others.  And unless other terms are proposed in which 
human agents can live their lives more clairvoyantly, the moral notions in which they cannot 




Nor can evaluative language be dispensed with simply because it does not conform to the 
logic of the model of modern science.  Taylor proposes the Best possible Account (BA) principle 
in response to projectivist theories of moral judgment and the attempts to distinguish “facts” 
from “values”146.  The BA notes that the sphere in which we try to explain and deliberate about 
our future action, in which we evaluate our character, feelings, reactions, behaviors and lifestyle 
and those of others, is one whose vocabulary we assume as the most realistic and insightful147. 
These terms that we select to understand human life are indispensable, understood as the 
narration that makes the most sense to us and in which we dwell, at least until it is possible to 
replace them with another.  For the BA is the most credible explanation we have of the reality of 
human affairs,  although provisionally.  This is the ontology BAs can offer, again distinct from 
Platonic ontology and the purported universal objectifying neutrality of modern reason. 
This is possible because our culture has separated the Platonic synthesis between the 
scientific explanation and the moral notion:  physics is no longer anthropocentric, it no longer 
uses its terms to express itself, nor can human science express itself in the terms of physics 
because it wouldn’t be understood appropriately148.  “Our value terms purport to give us insight 
into what it is to live in the universe as a human being, and this is a quite different matter from 
that which physical science claims to reveal and explain”149. 
Now this tight ethical realism underlies authenticity not on the mere affirmation of choice 
itself.  This perverts authenticity since the differences affirmed in that election are not valued.  
They become insignificant.  “We cannot, therefore, reasonably pretend that a truncated way of 
life is moral for certain people based on the defense that they have a right to it”150.  This position 
of Taylor is contrary to the universalism of the impartiality of modern thought, and argues that 




intensely valued goods to reflect and make an opinion about what we live151.  Likewise, we use 
them to determine what is thought of others and to universally judge other ways of life based on 
those strong criteria of value that we receive and possess.  The strength of the proof lies in the 
very strength of these criteria and in their ability to express values that cannot be undervalued, 
since they contain content whose lack of knowledge, forgetfulness or destruction would go 
against our very way of being.  However, the strength of these criteria can only be justified 
within a given framework or horizon of significance and for subjects who share such horizon152. 
Belonging to a horizon of significance is articulated in a reflexive way in the conscience 
of a subject when articulating her/his BA and defining her/himself, that is, naming her/his 
identity.  Therefore, this appears linked to the recognition of the highest goods that are expressed 
in a full and desirable way of life.  But more than just attractive formulations and articulations of 
the desirability of a full form of human life, they involve a hierarchy of goods and, as Taylor 
shows, the recognition of a certain objectivity of higher goods.  In fact, authenticity depends on 
the recognition of the transcendence of the horizons of significance;  by appealing to them they 
appear to be independent of the subject’s will.  They are not merely chosen.  Horizons of 
significance constitute something given153.  We’ll delve later into the elements that are received. 
It is important to recall that the objectivity of higher goods is relative, since the horizons 
of significance that are given to us are expressed in linguistic articulations within a cultural 
group.  Consequently, this hermeneutical position recognizes the possibility that there are forms 
of realization of the human that are incommensurable with each other154. 
As a result of the modernization process and the greater cultural plurality, there has been 
a diversification of the goods by which we moderns move.  This has produced that we do not 




This highest good is what Taylor calls hypergood;  our identity, our sense of being a person with 
the ability to take our own position and a direction in life will be marked by our commitment to 
this hypergood.  That is, they provide the point of view from which to weigh, judge, and decide 
on other goods.  This status is precisely what defines “the moral” in our culture:  a set of goods 
or demands that not only have a particular importance, but also surpass and allow others to be 
judged. 
However, as shown, hypergoods produce epistemological tensions.  Briefly going 
through the most significant ones from this perspective will help us delve into Taylor's proposal 
in response to the currents that mute qualitative distinctions and horizons of significance.  In the 
first place, the recognition of hypergoods is understood as the passage from a primitive or 
average condition of the moral conscience to a superior one, where we recognize ourselves 
guided by a certain sphere of goods that we consider to have incomparably greater dignity156.  
The critics of modern culture are varied.  Those who embrace the principle of universal and 
egalitarian respect are suspicious of any requirement that may be illusory or self-destructive, or 
that minimizes natural desires and their satisfaction, or even becomes a justification for 
domination and social oppression157.  Nietzsche took his criticism further and claimed what was 
supposedly the lowest in us or in our will of power to reach the self-affirmation of what we are.  
However, as Taylor insists, on the one hand, it is not possible to make sense of our moral life 
without something like the perspectives of a hypergood that allows us to grow and argue why 
this point of view is better than any other158.  And on the other, these and all the criticisms are 
committed to their own hypergoods, such as equal and universal respect or the will of power, 




Now, what authority has practical reason to hold that one hypergood is superior to 
others?  Naturalistic epistemology would use the natural sciences model, which supposes 
neutralizing our moral reactions, and would look for external decision criteria on questions of 
moral order.  On the other hand, the moral practical reasoning model that considers the linguistic 
moral ontology, proceeds by “transitions” of comparative proposals between hypergoods159.  
This  allows obtaining an objective epistemic gain, (in the sense discussed here) such as reducing 
errors, solving contradictions or confusions or gaps, standing as the best provisional account 
(BA), whose confidence arises from the fact that we have better grasped the situation we are 
facing160.  In this horizon of understanding, if I abstract myself from the moral intuitions that 
move me, I will be incapable of understanding any moral argument and therefore of making 
some epistemic gain. 
Secondly, the suspicion about hypergoods comes from the reference that some make to 
realities that transcend human life, such as nature, the Idea of good or God, which have no place 
in the explanation of the natural sciences.  The utilitarian and Kantian currents particularize this 
position.  We will mention them briefly, knowing that each one requires in-depth treatment. 
Utilitarianism echoes the liberation associated with nominalism, posed by the modern 
independence of the subject who determines his own purposes without interference from external 
authority.  Normative orders must originate in the will of the subject according to what she/he 
wishes and not in a cosmic order independent of her/his will.  Utilitarianism in its most mature 
version indicates that each person is the best judge of her/his own happiness.  It rejects all 
religious paternalism, which results in the rejection of the idea that good is founded on a certain 
natural order.  Along with sustaining the affirmation of ordinary life, it affirms the freedom of 




This set of motives converges to discredit qualitative distinctions, making them appear 
intellectually suspicious and morally sinister.  However, it will be very difficult for utilitarianism 
to understand what is the moral motivation to which it appeals when it relates the motivational 
theory of hedonism with the social benevolence that it supposes.  Utilitarianism tries to reconcile 
the principle of utility and self-interest that seeks individual happiness with the happiness or 
well-being of society:  subjects driven by self-interest, by utility, by their own benefit that 
benefits others. 
On the other hand, Kant distinguishes between actions performed by duty and those 
performed by inclination, which is based on his distinction between the desire for happiness and 
respect for the moral law.  He shares the emphasis on freedom as self-determination and the 
moral law as something that emanates from our will and that has a universal rational character.  
As one of the formulations of the categorical imperative points out:  “act as if the maxim of your 
action should become, for your will, universal law of nature”161.  Kant’s moral source is found in 
the dignity of the rational agent, whose status is unique in the universe, and whose moral 
obligations are determined by her/his reason.  It dismisses as irrelevant the qualitative 
distinctions that separate the upper from the lower in human nature or in the cosmos.  What are 
important would be the criteria that guide the action, not the visions of good. 
Faced with realities that have no place in the explanation of modern science, Taylor 
vindicates the separation between moral notions and scientific explanations (to which we have 
already referred), so the appearance of the natural sciences does not prevent us, if we take the 
coherence of BA seriously, to perceive God or the Idea of Good or nature as essential for the best 
explanation we can present of the moral world.  The acceptance of any hypergood connects in a 




We must specify that this connection between perception of the good and the fact of 
being moved by the good does not represent the standard of a subjectivist model.  “We sense in 
the very experience of being moved by some higher good that we are moved by what is good 
[and infinitely valuable] in it rather than that it is valuable because of our reaction”162 as 
postulated by naturalisms.  Notwithstanding, the most reliable from the moral point of view, is 
not justified from outside of our moral intuitions, but on those intuitions that are more intense 
and that must respond to BA transitions.  And the way to know if one is correct is to ask oneself 
if the new best provisional account poses a transition from my current belief towards error 
reduction, etc.  In this, it is shown that the perception of a hypergood, in addition to offering the 
reasons and the meaning of our moral actions, works as a guiding sense of what is most 
important and thus also helps to configure the identity of the human agent.  As Taylor has been 
insisting, the qualitative distinctions offered by reasons in moral thought are not external nor do 
they imply impassion, but anchored in our moral intuitions can somehow show that certain moral 
practices and fidelities are correct.  When I offer an explanation of my concerns and fundamental 
reasons for you to understand my life, you can see why the perception of a hypergood while 
offering a reason also helps define my identity163. 
Thirdly, the reason for the practical benevolence that coming from Christianity has 
influenced visions such as that of Bacon, who claims a type of scientific work that, in addition to 
creating objects of contemplation, mitigates the condition of humanity, improving its condition, 
reducing the poverty, increasing prosperity, etc.164 
Finally, the desire for a completely universal ethic comes into play when the goods that 
we articulate in qualitative distinctions are usually the goods of a particular cultural group and 




“Various combinations of these motives tend to bring Katians and Utilitarians [and 
others] together around theories of obligatory action and relatedly, lead them to share a 
procedural [rather than a substantive] conception of ethics”165, in which rationality or thought of 
the agent is judged by how she/he thinks and not by whether the result is substantively correct.  
What is important is how the result has been achieved, not the particular result itself.  This 
transition from substantive justification to procedural justification is associated with fidelity to 
the modern idea of freedom166;  thus, for the utilitarians, practical rationality will be the 
maximization of the calculation of benefits; for Kantians it will be the universalization of the 
moral law167.  Paradoxically, hypergoods like freedom, altruism, and universalism lead to their 
negation. Procedural practical reason denies the hypergoods that move it.  But the Kantian 
principle of the just above the good shows itself inconsistent, since modern moral thought makes 
us inarticulate for some of the most important questions of morality that are removed from 
modern moral consciousness and reduced exclusively to obligations.  As has been said, given 
their focus only on obligatory action towards others, they tend to unify the moral sphere around a 
single consideration or ‘basic reason’ distorting thought and moral sensitivity. 
In short, as Taylor insists, modern moral philosophies of a naturalistic and scientific 
nature have bewitched the contemporary human being, making the notions of the superior and 
inferior cease to exist.  They have silenced qualitative distinctions and substantive articulations 
about the good, which has left the subject blind and dumb, unable to choose the object of her/his 
will and to determine her/his own actions and commitments, unable to say who she/he is.  The 
discovery of Taylor’s appellative realism, that is, the type of relative objectivity of the terms of 
value that are received in a web of interlocution is part of the output for a self-understanding of 




transaction between the world to which she/he belongs and her/his inwardness.  We will deepen 
on this in the next section. 
 
5. Exit towards an inhabited space for recognition.  The authentic identity 
between what is received and what is constructed 
We have observed that Taylor’s new ethical realism –his appellative realism– places us 
somewhere between the objectivist Platonism of values to which the human subject conforms 
and the subjective naturalistic projectivism that affirms the subject's constructive moral capacity.  
In this hermeneutic space there is an exchange, a transaction between the self-interpreting being 
and the world in which it is becoming.  There are various aspects that the subject receives, which 
in principle do not depend on her/him, to be in turn reworked personally and collectively, 
shaping her/his personal and collective authentic identity as human beings. 
This highlights the dialogical structure of the constitution processes of human identity, 
structure that has been forgotten by the monological turn of the dominant modern philosophy.  It 
“seriously underestimates the place of the dialogical in human life, […] it forgets how our 
understanding of the good things in life can be transformed by our enjoying them in common 
with people we love;  how some goods become accessible to us only through such common 
enjoyment”168.  More seriously, it forgets that “we become full human agents, capable of 
understanding ourselves, and hence of defining an identity, through our acquisition of rich 
human languages of expression”169.  As we have already suggested before, these languages, such 
as those of love, gesture, art, religious expression, etc., are received in exchange with others.  




incorporating a necessary solitary reflection.  Likewise other important things such as the 
definition of one’s identity are not carried out only in solitary reflection but in dialogue with 
significant others.  This conversation in which we define ourselves continues internally, even 
though those significant others are no longer present in our lives.  As Taylor recalls, our identity 
remains dialogical throughout our lives170.  Additionally, if some of the things that are of value to 
us are accessible in relation to the people we love, that person becomes something internal to my 
identity171.  In this sense, we have already studied the hermeneutical structure for that new 
language for the hypergoods and moral sources articulation that are given to us in a web of 
interlocution.  Thus, the frameworks and horizons of significance in which hypergoods make 
sense, we receive them but to be processed and transformed and appropriate. 
There are three other aspects that Taylor develops as part of the dialogical structure of 
human life and that are also part of the inherent demands of the ideal of authenticity.  First, the 
need to consider “the demands of our ties with others”172 that reveals the constitutive role of a 
moral community173 in understanding the moral fabric in which we constitute our identity174.  
This is expressed, as we will explain, in the modern need for recognition.  Second, consider the 
“demands of any kind emanating from something more or other than human desires or 
aspirations”175.  Third, the space of languages of personal resonance that put us in contact with a 
larger whole.  Let’s dig deeper. 
When we are blind to the constitutive role of a moral community, the ideal of self-
realization is degraded into a purely personal understanding where bonds and communities are 
merely instrumental.  On the intimate plane, others have to be subordinated to personal 
fulfillment;  unconditional bonds that can last a lifetime and are lived in a gratuitous way are 




actualizing individualism incorporates certain notions of how to live together in society176.  This 
instrumentalization of bonds is blind to links between recognition and identity, which acquire a 
particular characteristic in the modern culture of authenticity. 
Taylor shows that the acknowledgment of the relation between recognition and identity is 
something that became particularly problematic recently in the modern culture.  Because, in 
general terms, “our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the 
misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real 
distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or 
contemptible picture of themselves.  Non-recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be 
a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being”177.  
The history of discrimination and abuse of indigenous peoples, of black people, of woman, of 
homosexuals show us that a due recognition is a vital need.  Yet, now this is even more 
problematic due to two changes.  First, the collapse of social hierarchies that used to form the 
basis for the recognition of honor, intrinsically linked to inequalities and a role within society 
(monarchy, clergy, army, peasant, craftsman, etc.).178  Second, in the face of this, the idea of 
dignity used in universalist and egalitarian terms arises, moving from honor for a few to the 
dignity for all.  That is one of the origins of the forms of equal recognition that have been 
essential to democratic culture179. 
Nevertheless the possibility of personal definition through roles or social classes within a 
democratic society has also been weakened.  Thus, “what does decisively undermine this socially 
derived identification is the ideal of the authenticity itself”180.  The importance of recognition has 
been modified and intensified by this new understanding of individual authentic identity that 




together with the ideal of being true to myself and my own particular way of being.  As we 
already pointed out, it should be noted that although identity must be generated internally, this is 
not synonymous with isolation, but through dialogue.  Thus “my discovering my own identity 
doesn’t mean that I work it out in isolation, but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, 
partly internal, with others.  That is why the development of an ideal of inwardly generated 
identity gives a new importance to recognition.  My own identity crucially depends on my 
dialogical relations with others”181.  This new situation challenges the human being because 
although there was always a certain degree of dependence on others, since “general recognition 
was built into the socially derived identity by virtue of the very fact that it was based on social 
categories that everyone took for granted [, yet] inwardly derived, personal, original identity 
doesn’t enjoy this recognition a priori182.  It has to win it through exchange, and the attempt can 
fail”183. 
So, in a personal realm, our “identity can be formed or malformed through the course of 
our contact with significant others.  [… It] needs and is vulnerable to the recognition given or 
withheld by significant others”184.  Therefore those relationships that define my identity cannot 
be expended;  “if my self-exploration takes the form of such […] temporary relationships, then is 
not my identity that I am exploring, but some modality of enjoyment”185. 
In social terms, the emphasis on the notion of dignity has articulated a “politics of 
universalism, emphasizing the equal dignity of all citizens, and the content of this politics has 
been the equalization of rights and entitlements”186, underlain by the notion of a supposed 
neutrality and the loss of the value category that we have analyzed187.  Faced with this 
equalization, Taylor seeks in the political idea of equal recognition the basis for a 




democracies and the recognition of the particularities of cultural traditions and historically 
constituted forms of identity. 
Taylor is lucid in showing that “recognizing difference, like self-choosing, requires a 
horizon of significance, in this case a shared one”188.  For the danger of the politics of difference 
(contrary to the universalism of dignity) is that it considers all ways of life and forms of identity 
as equally valuable in themselves due to the fact of their mere difference.  But mere difference is 
not a foundation for equality of value.  For instance, men and women, as Taylor notes, are equal 
because above the differences we recognize that there are common or complementary properties 
that have a certain value.  This requires that we share certain standards of value where the 
identities in question are shown to be equal.  Otherwise the equality that we defend will be only 
an imposture or an empty act. 
For this study, this social dimension shows Taylor’s understanding of human dignity.  In 
front of the modern assumption of dignity as a right, he understands dignity from the value 
category.  Namely, this would be a capacity that all human beings share, “a universal human 
potential”189 that must be respected equally for all but in whose conception the elements of 
emergence, development, and process of constitution are central.  Taylor recovers the idea that 
modern liberal thought attributes to subjects as a fact what is only a capacity that must be 
developed in dense social, cultural and material settings.  Two ways of understanding politics are 
based on this twofold way of understanding the idea of ‘equal dignity’:  on the one hand, the 
classical contractualism of blind neutrality of the public sphere with respect to particular worlds;  
and on the other, the one that understand that this sphere can be especially sensitive to promoting 




the one hand, neutral impartiality, and on the other hand, an equality interested in particularity 
and its recognition190. 
Taylor is not advocating for the elimination of the distinction between the just and the 
good or the idea of ‘equal dignity’, but how to instill in it a sense of substantive value without 
unfair and arbitrary discrimination and exclusions.  That is the balance between community and 
rights, between the idea of “equality” and the idea of “recognition”.  Taylor articulates the 
political heritage of liberalism, with its deduction and attention to the idea of fairness and 
impartiality, with the particular cultural traditions and with the ideas of good that those traditions 
embody191.  These are fundamental in the constitution of the authentic identity of the human 
being. 
Let us now consider the second dimension of the dialogical structure of the human 
condition:  the demands that come from something that is beyond human aspirations.  Taylor 
explains how and why human identity in the horizon of the “authenticity in not enemy of 
demands that emanate from beyond the self;  it supposes such demands”192.  For defining 
ourselves and determining what our originality consists in requires us to take as background what 
is significant.  This demands that we overcome the reduction, as we have already described, of 
soft relativism and self-determined freedom that accentuates the value of “choice” itself.  It 
supposes that things have no meaning in themselves but that they acquire it when someone 
decides, thinks or believes it.  But if that were so, we could not explain this claim by making it 
intelligible, nor could it be subject to criticism.  Personal impression cannot determine what is 
significant.  Furthermore, the difference becomes insignificant.  As we have already indicated, 




horizon of significance, for which some things are worthwhile and others not, long before the 
election. 
Taylor emphasizes both in relation to the authentic identity of the human being whose 
significance comes from her/his own choice.  It not only depends on those horizons being given, 
but also, “depends on the understanding that independent of my will there is something noble, 
courageous, and hence significant in giving shape to my own life. […] Self choice as an ideal 
makes sense only because some issues are more significant than others”194.  Conversely, if 
significance depended only on one’s choice, nothing would be significant.  A horizon of issues 
of importance is required to help define the aspects in which the formation of one's identity 
becomes significant.  In this sense, contemporary forms of culture that focus on self-fulfilment 
by fleeing and opposing the demands of society or history or nature, etc., are only “narcissistic” 
and superficial forms of authenticity.  Paradoxically, the reductive understanding of freedom that 
is closed to the demands that come beyond the self, destroys the conditions for choosing a 
meaningful life. 
Consequently, authentic identity can be defined “only against the background of things 
that matter”195 and that are silenced by modern procedural culture:  history, nature, society, the 
demands of justice and solidarity, the needs of recognition of discriminated groups, the duties of 
the citizen or the call of the God of history. 
How is the need for openness coordinated with what the “world” starts as a call to 
respond authentically with the force of modern subjectivation?  Subjectivity founds the critical 
attitude that mobilizes us not to accept the dictates of authority in themselves but to think for 
ourselves.  However, in order not to be closed in on ourselves, Taylor introduces an important 




authenticity that drives us to discover and articulate our own identity.  Namely, authenticity has 
two facets, one regarding “the manner and the other concerning the matter or content of 
action”196.  Regarding the manner of embracing a certain ends and ways of life, authenticity 
refers to itself:  this must be “my” orientation.  Not so with regard to the content.  As we have 
seen, these should not refer to the subject and it is not necessary that the expression of her/his 
aspirations be made in opposition to what is beyond the subject.  On the contrary, the relevant 
significances are independent of our wishes.  But, “to confuse these two kinds of self-
referentiality is catastrophic”197.  As Taylor well recalls, there is no longer a homogeneous public 
reference point that makes us share the assumptions, but rather a plurality of significances as if it 
were a forest in whose light gaps different aspects of reality open up and resonate in different 
ways in people.  Taylor himself refers to it with an example about modern poetry, whose 
language defines, creates and at the same time reveals and manifests a greater reality:  “the 
inescapable rooting of poetic language in personal sensibility doesn't have to mean that the poet 
no longer explores an order beyond the self”198.  The important thing that Taylor shows is that 
while we can no longer be naive realists and trust in the objective reality of essences that are 
beyond the observable, neither we can shut ourselves up in the subjectivity of the disengaged and 
instrumental reason that consider the world only as raw materials at hand for our projects.  We 
“still need to see ourselves as part of a larger order that can make claims on us”199. 
This leads us to consider the third aspect that accounts for the dialogical structure of the 
human condition and that at the risk of schematic superficiality we will only make a reference, 
since this requires further development.  To grasp the demands that our world to which we 
belong has on us, we need to enter the space of languages of personal resonance (which, as the 




true to ourselves:  recognizing the languages that put us in contact with a larger whole in a 
deeper and more interior way. 
In this space of languages of personal resonance, a hypergood might be as much found as 
made, empathizing that there is something like a hypergood that is not exhausted in any language 
we use to refer to it.  As Taylor says, Rilke takes us “beyond expressivism and beyond any 
temptation to a mere celebration of our epiphanic power, to the central issue of the nature of 
epiphany, not just as our action, but as a transaction between ourselves and the world […;] 
transfiguration is a task laid on us by the world”200.  It seems that for Taylor the transaction 
between the world and ourselves is something which the world initiates.  We are responders to a 
call from something already there in the world, arising in our experience in the form of a 
“constitutive factual good” that promises some kind of fullness for our life, far from any arrogant 
self-celebration of human abilities. 
But if there is the appellative realism of these hypergoods that we found and made at the 
same time thanks to the world’s initiative, does this mean that the human being is structurally 
open to transcendence?  And if so, to what kind of transcendence?  In the next sections we will 
delve into it. 
 
6. Fullness as an exit towards transcendence? 
We have shown that the human being is structurally oriented towards good. For this 
reason, the possibility of an authentic human identity in a strong sense, that is, of being a self 
with the ability to take a position with an orientation in life, implies the reception and personal 




communities.  They bring us into contact with the backgrounds of things that matter, the 
hypergoods that are beyond individual aspirations and against which our identity is shaped.  We 
have mentioned as examples history, nature, society, the demands of justice and solidarity, the 
recognition needs of discriminated groups, the citizen duties or the call of the God of history.  
The hypergoods are what make our life have a certain moral/spiritual form and that we can 
experience it daily full of meaning201. 
However, the question about the lack of meaning in our culture is not reduced to the lack 
of articulation of our frameworks, of the moral sources and of the hypergoods that guide our 
lives.  Our time is haunted by the “the specter of meaninglessness”, which is, in a sense, a 
dispatch from fullness.  We experience this for example in our experience of time:  faced with 
the chronological homogeneity of secular time, the human being experiences, as we have already 
explained, the need to make sense of his/her own history through a narrative that gives unity, 
foundation and orientation to his/her life.  But as we will see, in the modern secular condition 
lurks the fear that we may be making this up202. 
Taylor suggests that “this theme is indeed special to modernity; […] in earlier years, it 
would have seemed bizarre to fear an absence of meaning.  When humans were posed between 
salvation and damnation, one might protest at the injustice and cruelty of an avenging God, but 
not that there were no important issues left”203.  In Taylor’s view, it speaks of (a) the desire of 
eternity, “the desire to gather together the scattered moments of meaning into some kind of 
whole” 204, and (b) of inherent teleology in our actions, “one that seems to always implicitly have 
an “ultimate” to which it is aimed, even if we so often concern ourselves with the 
penultimate”205.  As we have already explained, these ultimate or constitutive goods, into and 




subject.  In this sense, they present themselves as “a place of fullness, or richness which 
transcends the ordinary to which we orient ourselves morally or spiritually” 206. 
Taylor is very clear in pointing out that a place for fullness is not a hidden way of talking 
about God;  this yearning is inscribed in the human structure.  “It arises out of a sense that there 
are goals which could engage us more fully and deeply than our ordinary ends [that] will not 
easily be uprooted from the human heart”207.  However, it is not that the human agent is focused 
on meaning as such –that is the structure– “rather than on some specific good or value.  One 
might die for God, or the Revolution, or the classless society, but not for meaning”208. 
In this sense, Taylor recognizes that he is “taking it as axiomatic that everyone, and hence 
all philosophical positions, accepts some definition of greatness and fullness in human life”209.  
“There is no escaping some version of […] “fullness”;  for any liveable understanding of human 
life, there must be some way in which this life looks good, whole, proper, really being lived as it 
should.  The utter absence of some such would leave us in abject, unbearable despair”210.  In this 
sense, both believers and non-believers have their own versions of fullness.  And both fight 
reductionist conceptions of a narrow scientific materialism that would leave no room for fullness. 
What are these reductionist visions?  Within the varied forms that materialism presents, 
Taylor concentrates on two.  First, the mechanistic explanation of the world interprets it only 
through efficient causation and considers any recourse to meanings and teleology in our 
explanations an illusion.  Second, motivational materialism explains action only based on the 
lower motives, not in moral aspirations or, strong evaluations.  Again, it is both epistemological 
and moral motives that support the materialistic perspective of the modern science that bewitch 
the human being.  Among the former, the position of external, from nowhere and impartial vision 




postulated to be able to carry on human existence without the need for teleological illusions or 
meaning.  Furthermore, they submit that religious or metaphysical considerations would separate 
us from concrete and daily concerns for happiness, desire and human suffering211. 
Then, Taylor presents three forms of human achievement that in our culture are defended 
as a possibility that escapes materialistic possibilities:  about agency, ethics and aesthetics.  First, 
“there is the sense that we aren’t just determined, that we are active, building, creating, shaping 
agents”.  Second, “there is also a spiritual objection: we have higher ethical/spiritual motives”.  
And third, from the aesthetic we experience that “art, nature moves us;  we have a deeper sense 
of meaning;  we can’t see our “aesthetic” responses as just another form of pleasurable reaction. 
They have a deeper significance”212. 
As we said, both believers and non-believers positions have their own approach to answer 
what real fullness consists in, and some lean firmly on immanence while the others posit some 
transcendent source or power.  Nevertheless, Taylor will consistently question:  whether one’s 
ontology is adequate to support a sense of fullness and if one’s position is really viable213.  For 
instance, the Modern Moral Order (MMO) that understands human beings as rational, sociable 
agents that collaborate in peace for their mutual benefit and for the defense of their rights.  It is a 
high calling to altruism and other-regard.  However, as Taylor has account, because of an 
inadequate appreciation for moral sources, modernity fixates on scrupulous moral codes of social 
behavior that delineate high moral expectations with very specific rules.  But it doesn’t mean that 
we know how to make people moral.  Codes don’t make people care for their neighbor or for 
other creatures or for the environment.  In other words, codes are inadequate as moral sources 
precisely because they do not touch on the dynamics of moral motivation that we have shown in 




resistance in Martin Luther King Jr, or the life of courage and prophecy in Monseñor Oscar 
Arnulfo Romero, or the activist determination of Berta Cáceres, or forgiveness in Nelson 
Mandela.  Even in the face of the modern determination to end suffering supported in the power 
and greatness of the human nature.  But, is it enough?  In the extreme case of the blackguards, 
the failures, the useless, the dying, those on the way out, in brief, those who negate the promise 
of human greatness, does not human history show that “perhaps only God, and to some extent 
those who connect themselves to God, can love human beings when they are utterly abject”215?  
Or that only they can stay with the sufferers when there is nothing more to do than just being 
there?  Taylor will delve into a series of dilemmas that have no definitive solution either from an 
immanent perspective or from a transcendent interpretation:  the experience of evil, the meaning 
of suffering, the question of meaning and death, or the understanding of the place of sexuality 
and violence in human life. 
Once again the human’s concern is dual.  First, we want to discover what the moving 
force is here, to give an account which does justice to it.  Second, we sense that getting it right 
will help to strengthen it, and to liberate it from the motives that could turn it into its opposite216. 
It is suggestive that Taylor links the constitutive goods or moral sources, with respect to 
which the subjects learn to move and at the same time are moved, with a place of fullness217, in 
any of its three modes.  Whether as a way of (1) identifying the fullness that guides and allows us 
to perceive what it is made of, moving us deeply but not always clearly:  the presence of God, 
the voice of nature, the force that flows through things, the work to achieve a wish or drive to 
build.  Or (2) modes of distance that produce boredom, lack of power, the feeling of exile and 
confusion.  Or (3) in its intermediate state mode to which the subject generally aspires:  a certain 




relationships, in which we exercise a vocation that gives us satisfaction and we experience that 
we contribute to the common welfare.  In this case, a certain daily contact with the significance 
of our activities and the confirmation that we are moving slowly towards that place of fullness 
are vital218.  In these three modes –the proximity of fullness, exile or intermediate forms– the 
place of fullness is not something that one possesses, there is still a way to go, although it does 
not necessarily imply a state beyond this life.  This arises especially when the effort is put into 
“understand better belief and unbelief as lived conditions, not just as theories or sets of beliefs 
subscribed to”219.  Since it is in the lived experience where we look for the most credible 
explanation for the reality of human affairs, including credible frameworks, hypergoods and 
moral sources, and a notion of fullness and the immanent or transcendent force on which it relies. 
In this sense, believers and non-believers have different ways of experiencing that 
fullness and the source of power that can bring us closer to that fullness, because we experience 
the world differently.  From their perspective, believers explain the place of fullness in reference 
to God, understanding it as something that is beyond human life and/or nature but that comes 
towards them (the reference to the horizon of the Judeo-Christian God experience is evident): 
…often or typically, the sense is that fullness comes to them, that it is something they 
receive;  moreover, receive in something like a personal relation, from another being 
capable of love and giving;  approaching fullness involves among other things, practices 
of devotion and prayer (as well as charity, giving);  and they are aware of being very far 
from the condition of full devotion and giving;  they are aware of being self-enclosed, 
bound to lesser things and goals, not able to open themselves and receive/give as they 
would at the place of fullness.  So there is the notion of receiving power or fullness in a 
relation;  but the receiver isn’t simply empowered in his/her present condition;  he/she 
needs to be opened, transformed, brought out of self220. 
Instead, for modern unbelievers the power to reach fullness is within and is developed in 




different from the law that they can discover in nature, which causes them great admiration and 
respect221.  There are other naturalistic versions that in turn are admired of the instrumental 
reason and the heroic courage of the human being who faces a universe devoid of meaning and 
hostile, establishing her/his own rules for life.  The romantic strands have a reduced perception 
of reason and are suspicious of its destructive power, and find in nature and/or in the inner depths 
of the human being the sources of power to achieve the demands of fullness.  In this way, they 
emphasize reception rather than self-sufficiency but do not leave the immanent plane as a place.  
Instead contemporary postmodern trends emphasize the perpetual absence of fullness222. 
Taylor suggests that while all people have a sense of fullness the “modes of fullness 
recognized by exclusive humanisms, and others that remain within the immanent frame, are 
therefore responding to transcendent reality, but misrecognizing it223”, which impoverishes 
aspects of that reality.  However, this blindness to the transcendent is not exclusive to non-
believers.  Many believers in general, and not only fundamentalists, lose their personal 
relationship with the transcendence identified with God, when they believe they have been able 
to dominate it in their schemes of understanding, reducing it to a certain moral order or a certain 
sociopolitical program or a certain ritual rubricism closer to code fetishism and pseudo-magic 
power.  Without realizing it, they put themselves or their clear ideas of God (but not the 
transcendent God that comes towards them) or their moral codes as the ultimate or the highest224.  
Now, as the relationship with the fullness –or with the transcendent– cannot be understood from 
the impersonal and objectifying  perspective of modern science, it is not demonstrable that we 
are responding to a transcendent reality in our identifying and recognizing some mode of what 
Taylor has called fullness, and seeking to attain it, except insofar as it offers a better account of 




background of understanding that is articulated in a narrative (self) understanding226, which is 
effective when it confers meaning and substance to people’s lives, releasing a vital force227.  In 
this sense, “the “better-ness” of that account is something that has to be felt” somehow;  but “if 
one might not sense the force of this alternative account, it might still be possible to imagine how 
the world looks for someone who does”228. 
It is important to highlight that the existential context where we reach a Best provisional 
Account of our experience is always threatened by uncertainty.  Taylor shows that “secularity229 
is [the] condition in which our experience of and search for fullness occurs;  and this is 
something we all share, believers and unbelievers alike”230.  As we have already pointed out 
before, “it consists, among other things, of a move from a society where belief in God is 
unchallenged and indeed, unproblematic, to one in which it is understood to be one option 
among others, and frequently not the easiest to embrace”231;  the believer interpretation of our 
quest for fullness is an option that in many circumstances is embattled with more than reasonable 
questions. 
Consequently, although the most insightful explanation of our moral and spiritual 
experience can be captured by a theistic conception of existence –which is related to spiritual 
practices such as prayer, conversation, liturgy, solidarity praxis, commensality, etc.– that has 
brought me closer to the place of fullness or rescued from inner exile, I can rarely stop doubting 
completely. There is always a suspicion that I may be inventing everything;  “naïveté is now 
unavailable to anyone, believer or unbeliever alike”232.  Now we live our lives in a state of 
constant doubt and uncertainty, since there are always some experiences that are not adequate 




another perspective or because people that are intelligent and reasonably well oriented in life 
may not agree with our own interpretation. 
This change in the existencial background shows more seriously than the frameworks in 
which we articulate the image of fullness of our lives and the moral sources that give it strength 
are always limited and threatened by doubt.  We have shown that it is not possible to live without 
reference to a framework;  the secular context (and in which we must delve further) shows that 
the framework from which we interpret our lives can no longer be taken for granted.  Secularity 
supposes a plurality of interpretations with which we coexist and where we see ourselves holding 
one point of view among other possible ones.  Not only we do feel that our position is debatable, 
but we also have the possibility of experiencing the attractiveness or the strength underlying 
other orientations than ours.  Secularity demands from us to formulate our framework explicitly 
to understand the differential position of the interpretation of our vital orientation.  In this way 
we learn to live our faith or lack of faith reflexively between two positions:  “an “engaged” one 
in which we live as best we can the reality our standpoint opens us to;  and a “disengaged” one in 
which we are able to see ourselves as occupying one standpoint among a range of possible ones, 
with which we have in various ways to coexist”233.  Perhaps in this uncertainty lies today the 
possibility of a more meaningful life. 
 
6.1 Blindness for the triple transcendence that transforms within an immanent 
frame 
Taylor shows that in our current situation, the basic orientation we assume is not defined 
by bare apprehension of the facts.  The immanent order allows us both interpretations:  it can 




or it can be considered an obstacle to our ideal of autonomy, characteristic of exclusive 
humanism, or to our will of power, as the Neonietzscheans claim.  However, we must still 
clarify, on the one hand, the notion of transcendence that Taylor is using, and on the other, what 
he refers to with the immanent frame, that metaphorical concept related to a specific structure to 
which we have already referred. 
With Taylor we have already understood how in a plural context, the limited frameworks 
within which we interpret, feel and live our experience require to be formulated and articulated.  
In this lies, on the one hand, the possibility that the modern subject acquires an identity in the 
strong sense, with a significant orientation from which he/she takes a position, and on the other, 
the possibility of moving and being moved by what he/she understands as a place of fullness in a 
context of plurality of interpretations. 
Taylor is lucid in pointing out that “we have moved from a world in which the place of 
fullness was understood as unproblematically outside of or “beyond” human life, to a conflicted 
age in which this construal is challenged by others which place it “within” human life” (in a wide 
range of different ways).  This interpretation of reality as dual, in which two areas can be 
distinguished and separated, is possible thanks to what Taylor calls the great invention of the 
West:  “an immanent order in Nature, whose working could be systematically understood and 
explained on its own terms, leaving open the question whether this whole order had a deeper 
significance, and whether, if it did, we should infer a transcendent Creator beyond it.  This notion 
of the “immanent” involved denying—or at least isolating and problematizing—any form of 
interpenetration between the things of Nature, on one hand, and “the supernatural” on the other, 





This terminology allows Taylor to show that what he understands by secularity in our 
Age of Authenticity, refers to the context of understanding, both in its explicit formulations and 
the implicit background, in which our moral, spiritual and religious experience, and our search 
for fullness takes place235.  In this context, although the non-believing interpretations that shape 
our lived experience seem to be the most plausible, they are not the only ones.  For this reason, 
although all, believers and non-believers, understand the distinctions between the natural and the 
supernatural, between the immanent and the transcendent, the novelty of modern interpretation is 
the acceptance in the social imaginary of the separation between “nature” and something 
transcendent with which you cannot necessarily interact236.  In this sense, the “immanent frame” 
refers to a “of immanent order which can be explained and accounted for in their own terms. 
That is what the modern idea of the “natural”, counterposed to the “supernatural”, [an 
“immanent” world, over against a possible “transcendent” one] means.  It is possible, even 
tempting to make a claim on behalf of this, that there is no need whatever to go beyond it to 
understand our world”237. 
Thanks to the prestige of natural science and the systems it tracks, this general shared 
understanding by believers and unbelievers tends to appear as the totality for sense-making.  
Thereupon, this constructed social space frames our lives entirely within a natural rather than 
supernatural shared order, precluding transcendence238.  As an enclosed, self-sufficient, 
naturalistic universe without any reference to transcendence, it encompasses our moral and 
spiritual seek for fullness, even if we believe in transcendence.  Therefore, Taylor claims that 
“the question isn’t whether we inhabit the immanent frame, but how”239. 
In this scenario Taylor places the discussion at the epistemological level.  He realizes that 




instituting representation as the foundation of all certainty regarding the real.  However, this is 
more a construction and an interpretation of human knowledge theory than evidence.  Likewise 
“The Death of God” and that we “discover” that we are alone in the universe and that if there’s 
going to be any meaning, we have to make it facing up reality in an adult way, is an invention of 
modernity based on science control and courage as a moral attitude.  And these motives became 
part of our social imaginary in which we live. 
The epistemological reduction of modern science hinders access to the transcendent, 
sincer it reduces the divine reality to the causal scheme that it uses to order and explain reality 
that is understands as “natural reality”.  It is this causal concept applied to God one of the factors 
that has made the modern subject blind to transcendence.  “From the mechanization of the world 
picture, and the atrophy of a sense of God as connected to a meaningful cosmos [there is a] new 
“univocal” understanding of being, predicated alike of God and of creatures240. […Thus] God 
becomes more easily conceivable as a very big and powerful Being, in fact, as the supreme 
Artificer, and his Providence more immediately understood in terms of its remarkable general 
Design”241.  Nevertheless, God (at least in the Christian interpretation) is not intelligible in the 
immanent cause–effect scheme, nor as a super provident object.  The other complementary factor 
is moral and is based on the triumphant pride of the human being who would be able to find in 
him/herself or in immanence the source to achieve the fullness of life. 
But in Judeo-Christianity, God is understood as a presence of which to become 
progressively aware or with which to be in communion, rather than a scientific conclusion to be 
discursively drawn or a deduction that one reached from evidence afforded by empirical 
inquires242.  God is not understood as the guarantor of an impersonal mechanism but as the 




Agape.  In this sense, that absolute and transcendent divine alterity, that is structurally related to 
immanence (without being reduced to or confused with it), does not impede or compete, but 
rather sustains, conveys and makes possible the life and freedom of the human being. 
Considering the above, Taylor explains that how one inhabits the immanent frame hinges 
on how one construe transcendence.  The problem is that not too much people articulate a 
position on these matters too often.  This is because, “not only is the immanent frame itself no 
usually, or even mainly a set of beliefs which we entertain about our predicament, however it 
may have started out:  rather [the immanent frame] is the sensed context in which we develop 
our beliefs” [,] “something we have trouble often thinking ourselves outside of, even as an 
imaginative exercise”243.  The immanent frame has seeped into our social imaginary, that is to 
say, it has become part of the background understanding:  our interpretation is not something 
reasoned to, as much as it is something we reason from244.  It is “a background to our thinking, 
within whose terms it is carried on, but which is often largely unformulated, and to which we can 
frequently, just for this reason, imagine no alternative”245.  In Wittgensteinian terms, it is more 
like the flycatcher bottle that holds us captive than a reasoned position or articulated worldview.  
Can we find a way out? 
The modern subject that conquered a non-vulnerable mode of existence with the feeling 
of control over the world and over itself sustained in the power of reason and science, started to 
experience a loss and a malaise in front of the disenchantment of the world:  the sensation of a 
flat, empty world, where humans have lost something246.  This produced a search in both 
believers and non-believers for “that something more” in front of the meaning of life, the need to 




In this context, the spiritual life that emerges from expressive revolution of the Age of 
Authenticity, “often springs from a profound dissatisfaction with a life encased entirely in the 
immanent order”.  As said, it is a quest for the individual.  Nothing is given or axiomatic 
anymore, so one has to find one’s faith:  “I have to discover my route to wholeness and spiritual 
depth.  The focus is on the individual and on his/her experience”247.  But, as Taylor has 
defended, it is not mere subjectivism and individualism.  There is a search for something else, 
but that must be relevant to the subject. 
Taylor shows it as the typical modern tension that affirms the value of ordinary life but 
yearns for something more.  And as he has said, depending on how one construe transcendence, 
one can understand that “finding out about oneself, expressing oneself, discovering one’s own 
way of becoming all that one can be” is opposed to “denying or sacrificing oneself for the sake 
of a super-self order of things, or even living by reference to such an order”248.  But this contrast 
can’t be considered exhaustive.  The ethic of authenticity is a personal quest that can end in the 
second term whose super-self order invokes one view of what is supremely important in life.  
There are no guarantees, but nothing ensures it’s opposite either249. 
Now, how can you understand the importance of something that involves relativizing 
what Taylor calls human flourishing?  In what sense is fullness achieved in this way?  Being 
willing to detach oneself from flourishing supposes responding and articulating our conception 
of realized life, which makes life worth living.  It is what we conceive, for example, when we ask 
ourselves what we most admire about people. 
So, this is one of the fundamental tensions in Christianity.  “Flourishing is good, 
nevertheless seeking it is not our ultimate goal; […] flourishing and the transcendent goal were 




human flourishing.  But the resignation necessary to achieve that ultimate goal is not part of 
human flourishing.  They cannot be collapsed into each other to make a single goal because 
“unless living the full span were a good, Christ’s giving of himself to death couldn’t have the 
meaning it does”250.  In this sense: 
…the call to renounce doesn’t negate the value of flourishing;  it is rather a call to centre 
everything on God, even if it be at the cost of forgoing this unsubstitutable good;  and the 
fruit of this forgoing is that it become on one level the source of flourishing to others, and 
on another level, a collaboration with the restoration of a fuller flourishing by God.  It is a 
mode of healing wounds and “repairing the world”251 
What is Taylor’s interpretation of transcendence, from which this way of inhabiting 
immanence is thought?  The Canadian thinker gathers the Christian tradition to propose a triple 
transcendence, placing the key of contact with this source, in the possibility of the 
transformation of the subject beyond our usual scope by participation in God’s love (theiosis252), 
which in turn expresses his approach to religious experience. 
First, “one believes in some agency or power transcending the immanent order”.  Second, 
“the crucial one […] is the sense that there is some good higher than, beyond human flourishing.  
In the Christian case, we could think of this as agape, the love which God has for us, and which 
we can partake of through his power.  In other words, a possibility of transformation is offered, 
which takes us beyond merely human perfection”.  And thirdly, “the Christian story of our 
potential transformation by agape requires that we see our life as going beyond the bounds of its 
“natural” scope between birth and death;  our lives extend beyond “this life”253.  Consequently, 
in Taylor’s view is essential to religion a fullness that requires the transformation of the human 
beyond mere this-wordly flourishing.  In this sense, religion is not just a collection of beliefs 




The aspiration to fullness by making contact with this greater reality implies 
understanding that humans have an unavoidable temporal dimension, which as we already 
explained is expressed in its narrative structure.  We are always in process, changing and 
becoming situated in time and open to a fullness that we sense, pre-like but have not yet reached.  
This is the horizon of Christian Eschatology that supposes that “this is a transformation which 
cannot be completed in history.  [We] as individuals, and as churches, hold open the path to the 
fullness of the kingdom”255. 
However, modern moral thought, which is limited to seeking the correct punctual action 
and that does not consider how the subject can become good and achieve some degree of 
fullness, has serious difficulties in accepting a horizon like this.  The modern moral thought 
thinks of subjects already made and not as subjects with capacities that can develop in dense 
social, cultural, material and spiritual frameworks.  Furthermore, the objectifying attitude typical 
of modern thought has a reduced subjective notion of what we can understand by “experience”;  
in fact, it does not consider this qualifying element.  From Descartes’ philosophy of knowledge 
and mind we receive this way of thinking “of experience as something subjective, distinct from 
the object experienced;  and as something to do with our feelings, distinct from changes in our 
being:  dispositions, orientations, the bent of our lives, etc.  That is, “experience” may have a 
causal effect on these latter, but it is defined separately from them” 256. In this horizon of 
understanding we become blind to contacts with transcendence, whether at revealing moments 
that modify life, in the daily practice of piety in prayer and service, in the awareness of what 
historical realities demand from us, in the transforming experience of ritual moments and 




Now, notwithstanding exclusive humanism shut down our openness to transformation, 
like Christianity, it offers remarkable testimonies of humanity and philanthropic action.  But both 
reflect a very different conception of the human being.  Taylor quotes Camus to speak of the 
heroism of someone who still lives in the midst of the perceived meaninglessness and 
worthlessness of life and who, faithful to the dignity of his rational being, seeks to live in 
harmony with the common interest and the good of others.  It is what Taylor calls a unilateral 
self-enclosed heroism whose image of fullness is the realization of lone rational individuals.  But 
is that what life is about?  Christian faith proposes a quite different view.  It supposes that the 
highest good consists in communion, mutual giving and receiving, as in the paradigm of the 
eschatological banquet.  Taylor uses the image of a parent raising his/her child.  “The child is 
being led by a parent along a path of growth.  But this is not just a service performed by one 
human being for another.  It only succeeds where it is other and more than this, where a bond of 
love arises.  This is a bond where each is a gift to the other, where each gives and receives, and 
where the line between giving and receiving is blurred.  We are quite outside the range of 
“altruistic” unilateralism”257.  This is what we Christians try to say happens when we allow 
ourselves to be reached by the Trinitarian God, by that stream of love that transforms us, history 
and creation. 
However, that the place of human fullness is better interpreted from the theistic vision or 
from the exclusive humanism vision is something that cannot be demonstrated;  it must be taken 
“on faith”.  The term “faith” is used here in a different sense from that referred to when we speak 
of a theistic religion.  What we are trying to say is that what drives the subject to adopt one or the 
other path is based on a “general sense” of things that anticipates or anticipates the reasons that 




cases) spiritual environment is a kind of “anticipatory confidence”, whether in belief and 
relationship with God or in an exclusive humanism or in the vindication of the will of power.  In 
this sense it is a "faith", a bet.  This does not mean that it is an arbitrary position;  the subject can 
try to express the considerations that motivate his/her position.  For instance, her/his idea of what 
is really important in human life or the ways in which he/she thinks that human life can be 
transformed or the constants in history (if any), etc.  Likewise, the life experiences of the subject 
can make his/her confidence in his/her position stronger or weaker258. 
In addition, in the case of Christianity, we can’t explain fully “what it means, lay it out in 
a code or a fully-specified life form, but only point to the exemplary lives of certain trail-blazing 
people and communities”259. 
As you can guess, to enter into this stream involves also a transformation of the frame in 
which we think, feel and live.  For in addition to the experience of openness to the transcendent 
that has been embraced as a notion of human fullness, we require, as Taylor teaches, that we can 
articulate about the values, goods and qualitative distinctions that form the framework against 
which this experience makes sense.  The new generations no longer share the horizon of meaning 
that opens up to the transcendent transformation.  Firstly, because the plural context in which we 
operate has broken common references.  Secondly, because the Modern Moral Order is very 
different from the divine/human Salvation History order.  And thirdly, because even in believing 
environments, the biblical imagery, the existential eschatological horizon, the practices of 
collective piety and the liturgical symbolic are accessible only to a minority. 
Finally, a transformative proposal has to face the moral prejudice that the Christian 
religious language refers to something “pre-modern” (God, evil, agape, miracles, penance, etc.) 




their own don’t have generally accepted referents, but which can point us beyond ordinary, 
“immanent” realities”.  Taylor propone que “what may have to be challenged here is the very 
distinction nature/supernature itself”260.  Will it be possible? 
 
Conclusions:  instructions and music to fly 
We have received some hermeneutical lenses from Charles Taylor’s vast toolbox to 
observe some structural features of the modern subject and of the secular condition in which 
she/he lives and interprets her/his existence.  To be more precise, these tools have helped us 
understand our own position as subjects oriented towards some good and looking for a place of 
fullness for our lives, because with Taylor, we believe that a neutral and universal position of 
observation is not possible. 
We can reconnect with the concerns that motivate this research with the aim of offering 
some conclusive lines from the greater clarity that Taylor has given us.  The phenomenon from 
which this research begins is the verification of the growing lack of meaning and deep emptiness 
among Chilean youth in the midst of a major cultural transformation process along with modern 
a neoliberal reforms during the last decades.  We went to Taylor to look for glasses that would 
allow us to better observe, understand and interpret the changes that modernity brings in this 
particular phase of its economic, consumption and education expansion in Chile.  Likewise, we 
ask ourselves if the Christian faith tradition have something to say and propose to this current 
generation that yearns for fuller ways of life in a more plural, meritocratic and open culture.  We 




of his analyzes of the current condition in which these phenomena occur.  Below we present the 
main conclusions. 
To present the main conclusions, we will first offer some elements of the epochal 
background in which the question of meaning in Chile arises today.  Then, I will explain two 
structural dynamics that I think need to be taken into account. (1) First, the metaphysical and 
practical priority of the affirmation of everyday life that suspects, on the one hand, of any 
articulation of valuations that may undermine its goodness, and on the other, of any teleology 
that indicates that more than life matters.  This collapse of priorities promotes a profound lack of 
meaning by silencing the question of good and fulfillment in the life of the modern subject, 
which, in turn and paradoxically, infringes upon the priority of everyday life.  In this sense, it is 
the recovery of the tension between the practical priority of the daily life of the human being and 
it’s metaphysical “no priority” that sustains the possibility of good and fullness of human life. (2) 
Secondly, the eschatological collapse between reality as we experience it and the full future that 
we hope.  Collapse that would appear to take place in the Chilean ecclesial environment which 
tends to reduce religious experience to moralism (be it social or sexual).  Let’s start. 
In these decades an era of authenticity has coincided with the rapid consolidation of the 
immanent frame.  As we learn from Taylor, this frame constitutes the background of meaning in 
which our beliefs, whether we are believers or non-believers, develop, and where we seek to 
make contact with the sources of fullness of life that we embrace, whether they are immanent or 
transcendent.  Some experience this immanent and self-sufficient order in a thoughtless way, 
characteristic of an exclusively naturalistic world view.  But for others, the alternative of keeping 
their eyes open to the irruption of various versions of transcendence arises.  Young people, who 




greater force that the closed immanent interpretation is the one that tends to be more accepted, 
quickly conquering the collective imagination. 
The dimension of authenticity of culture is expressed in that what has value for the 
human being today is understood in terms of individual self-fulfillment, fueled by a powerful 
moral ideal of being true to oneself.  This means that everyone has a right to develop their own 
form of life grounded on their own sense of what is really important or of value, and nobody can 
be forced to adopt an identity that he/she doesn’t want.  Appropriating our life and breed an 
identity of our own, inevitably happens to learn to be in contact with our inner experiences, 
naming what others (people, experiences, encounters, circumstances, nature, etc.) cause on us, 
what we think and what we feel, listening to our inner voice. 
Likewise, those looking for some kind of transcendent or religious experience, hope that 
in addition to being their choice, it speaks to them.  In this sense, religious experience must make 
sense to them, that is, it must not only be understandable but also pertinent in terms of their 
spiritual development as they understand it.  This relativizes community membership and 
collective participation.  Furthermore, children of an age that overvalues personal effort and 
merit, they relativize the monolithic authorities and do not feel pressured by having to adjust to 
some kind of orthodoxy.  In this condition, the search for horizons of meaning arises;  however, 
as Taylor shows, this search needs others both for the articulation of the goods that shape our 
identity in a strong sense, as well as for the opening to a place of fullness.  These offer meaning, 






The practical but not metaphysical primacy of human life 
One of the defining features of modernity is the affirmation of the value of ordinary life, 
which has been given both practical and metaphysical priority.  The first refers to the importance 
and goodness conferred on the life of reproduction, work, production and the family, and the 
effort to save life and the avoidance of suffering.  The second refers to the rejection of the claim, 
or at least opening the way for the insight, that more than life matters.  Paradoxically, this double 
priority, both metaphysical and practical, produces the conditions for a profound lack of 
meaning, loss of identity and emptiness in the modern subject, which, in turn, threatens the very 
affirmation of ordinary life.  I explain myself. 
In defense of the affirmation of ordinary life, ethical deliberation and the articulation of 
values and strong evaluations are viewed with suspicion, since these could hide a devaluation of 
everyday life based on superior forms of life that could be discriminatory or based on a delusion.  
These distinctions would eclipse the dignity and value of everyday human desire and its 
satisfaction, with some higher activity such as contemplation, citizenship or heroic asceticism.  
In addition, establishing a sphere of goods that possess greater dignity would infringe upon the 
principle of universal equality of the human being, and can become justification of domination 
and oppression.  For this reason, modern morality proposes a procedural, supposedly objective, 
abstract, impartial and universal approach to determine the correct obligatory action towards 
others, thus reducing moral issues to this dimension.  On the other hand, it considers that values 
and goods are not part of reality but merely projections of the subject, neglecting any possible 
ontological status of these.  Thus, what is truly important to human life is the determination of 
what is right and not what is good.  A procedure for this is what gives space to the supposedly 




This position silences both the question of good and the question of fulfillment in the life 
of the modern subject.  Both are reduced to something optional but not substantive.  But as we 
have learned from Taylor, the identity of the human being is structurally related to her/his ability 
to articulate about the good.  The subject lives and is mobilized by constitutive goods that do not 
depend on him and that promise the possibility of a full life.  Consequently, it is not possible for 
the subject to have identity and meaning and orientation for her/his life without something like 
the hypergood perspectives that are defined only against the background of things that matter.  
Nevertheless  these are silenced by modern procedural culture:  history, nature, society, the 
demands of justice and solidarity, the recognition needs of discriminated groups, the duties of the 
citizen, the daily life of work and family, or the call of the God of history.  In addition, the 
subject’s processual narrative structure is unknown, blinding him/her to the opening towards a 
place of fullness and the possibility of the transcendent.  This type of rehabilitation of ordinary 
life has difficulties accounting for the experience of evil and brokenness in history and thinks of 
the human subject as inherently innocent and self-sufficient.  This type of subject tends to 
develop an excoriating sense of only exogenous guilt:  the society, history, the “system”, 
capitalism, patriarchy, etc. 
Consequently and paradoxically, the defense of the affirmation of ordinary life, one of 
the ideas behind the procedural turn of modern morality, suppresses the question for the good life 
making us blind and dumb before the question of our own identity in a strong sense, and 
therefore, before the meaning of life. 
Notwithstanding, Taylor shows that values and hypergoods have an ontological status 
that we have called appellative realism;  they are real features of our world, though not as the 




naturalistic projectivism.  This opens a transaction space between the world to which the subject 
belongs and her/his inwardness.  For, although values do not have an existence independent of 
human beings, they do not depend on them either.  In other words, there is a recognition of the 
transcendent force exerted by the appeal to certain values that exceed the will or the interest of 
the subject and his particular circumstance. 
Another way of opening beyond the subject is the linguistic communities where he/she 
receives language, evaluations, frameworks and the ability to articulate them. In this sense, our 
own inwardly generated identity depends on our dialogical relationship with others, not on 
isolation. 
What is appearing is that when the human being abandons the notions of the superior or 
inferior, de facto giving practical and metaphysical priority to a single notion of value such as 
ordinary life and silencing qualitative distinctions and substantive articulations about the good, 
he/she goes being blind and dumb, unable to choose the object of his/her will, to determine 
his/her own actions and commitments, and thus orient his/her life towards a place of fulfillment 
that is processually achieved.  The human being is left unable to say who he/she is.  The 
discovery of Taylor’s appellative realism, that is, the type of relative objectivity of the terms of 
value that are received in a web of dialogue is part of the exit for a self-understanding of the 
subject and the configuration of his/her identity, in relation to a broader space.  A space of 
transaction between the world to which he/she belongs and his/her inwardness. 
At the next level, the practical and metaphysical priority of ordinary life absolutizes the 
modern aspiration to the fullness of one’s life against a vain or empty life.  In human experience, 
that place of fullness is experienced as something that is still incomplete, that we are in the 




understood in different ways in contemporary culture depending on the determination of the 
good that guides and mobilizes the subject and with respect to which he seeks to be correctly 
located.  For instance, regarding God this contact can be a relationship in sacramental terms, 
and/or prayer, and/or community bonds, and/or active commitment in history, etc.  For those 
who are moved by some form of affirmation of ordinary life, the most important thing is to 
ensure a good job, a good family and the possibility of contributing to the common good.  The 
key question is which moral source associated with daily life as a place of fullness supports and 
makes its realization viable.  Can we affirm that this possibility arises from itself? 
There are two aspects that challenge modern subject and equally the affirmation of daily 
life.  First of all, if we talk about the affirmation of daily life we cannot help but wonder for what 
goes wrong and have some account of evil and brokenness.  The affirmation of the goodness of 
ordinary life in modern culture has been the affirmation of the essential goodness, innocence of 
our original, spontaneous aspirations.  Evil tends to be seen as exogenous to the human being, 
who has some sort of innate innocence.  And secondly, in the face of the sense of 
meaninglessness of this time, is the mere affirmation of daily life enough to give meaning and 
orientation to the homogeneous and secular chronological time, objectified by modern science?  
Is there something else? 
The acceptance of some hypergood connects in a complex and intrinsic way with the fact 
that it moves us.  It is part of the strength of the Better provisional Account argument.  What is it 
that God moves as hypergood and the life in Him as place of fullness?  “A love/compassion 
which is unconditional, that is, not based on what you the recipient have made of yourself. […] 
The love is not conditional on the worth realized in you just as an individual, or even in what is 




his/her moral life to live with meaning, from the transcendent Other he/she receives and 
participates in a force that transforms him/her and enables him/her to fulfill the good of the 
human being.  In other words, if the daily life of the human being has a practical priority, 
paradoxically, the recognition that there is a hypergoods beyond human life, as a God who 
reveals her/himself as unconditional love, at least promises to allow and convey that we affirm 
the wholeheartedly value of the human life.  Given the dialogical structure of the processes of 
constitution of human identity, at the existential limit, it is the reception of unconditional love 
that puts us in front of the truest image as human beings.  This experience of transcendent love as 
foundational recognition is what opens us to the equal value of each human being in his/her 
particularity and to a fuller mode of being, which is in process but which is not a condition for 
receiving that unconditional love or agape. 
Therefore, it is the recovery of the tension between the practical priority of the daily life 
of the human being and it’s metaphysical “no priority” that could sustain the possibility of good 
and fullness of human life.  And at the same time, it could prevent human beings from becoming 
blind and dumb regarding their identity and how to enrich life so that it is worth living.  This is 
not demonstrable but the Better provisional Account could testify by the vital force it releases. 
 
Eschatological collapse 
There is another dynamic tension that is important to keep in mind.  It is the 
eschatological tension between, on the one hand, the present life, whether it is interpreted as a 
life traversed by evil and suffering or it is interpreted from a project of a social order that is 




expressed, for instance, with images such as “Reign of God”, “New Heaven and New Earth” in 
the Judeo-Christian tradition.  Let’s dig deeper. 
The distancing of Chileans, and particularly their youth, from participation in the 
Catholic Church has been taking place slowly since the 1960s, a process that has accelerated 
since the return to democracy in 1990.  It is not easy to establish causal relationships at this time 
of history, nor can I determine with precision when it began, but I would like to highlight a 
dynamic that I have called the eschatological collapse and whose shock wave can only continue 
to distance the Church from the young when we all inhabit a space marked by an immanent 
frame in the age of authenticity. 
When Chile regained democracy, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church decided to “volver 
a lo propiamente suyo” –go back to what is more proper to them–, interpreting “lo suyo” as a 
spiritual mission distinct from the project of solidarity and the defense of human rights.  
However, what apparently happened was that “lo suyo” meant a turn from a Samaritan Church to 
a Sexual Church, with an obsessive concern about issues of personal sexual morality.  The 
ecclesial discourse acquired a certain “reformist” tone in response to what they interpreted as a 
deep moral crisis in Chile.  As we pointed out in the introduction, the hierarchy changed the 
“value agenda” and the type of political alliances, trying to impose its vision of moral and social 
order in the public space.  Obviously this does not mean that moral issues are not relevant or that 
we cannot discuss the pertinence of the participation of the Churches in public sphere.  What I 
claim is that when a certain moral discourse prevailed with the pretense of truth that should be 
imposed on the rest, it tended to lose the dynamic tension between reality, which is effectively 




Our experience of Christian faith is eschatological, that is, related to what we call “the 
last things”, with the future.  But this is more than the future tense.  We believe that all reality, 
the entire universe and us and our history in it, is open not only to the future time, but to the 
future of time itself, to the future of God.  “In God’s future, God comes to God’s creation and, 
through the power of God’s righteousness and justice, frees it for God’s kingdom and makes it 
the dwelling place of God’s glory”262.  The Christian dimension of our eschatology assumes that 
the divine future that we can expect already began with the coming of the Messiah, Jesus Christ 
of Nazareth and that therefore we are on the way, in process until the definitive irruption of God. 
This eschatological horizon is already in action through the Spirit that is transforming 
reality towards the Reign of peace and justice that Jesus proclaimed in the Sermon of the Mount, 
but has not yet been fulfilled.  This tension between a present crossed by evil, suffering and sin 
and the eschatological future towards which we are going, collapses and is lost when the 
religious experience is reduced to a certain contingent moral order.  The illusion that identifies 
reality itself with the future Reign makes one’s own notion of civilization, progress, and morality 
become absolute and seek to impose as if the Reign had already arrived.  Something similar 
seems to have happened with a fraction of the Chilean Church enthusiastic about the project of 
socialist liberation through the democratic route in the early 1970s, which tended to identify that 
proposal as the only way to bring about the realization of the Reign of peace, life and justice.  
Despite the left imaginary helped to specify and express alternative dynamic horizons, this 
became the instance in which experiences are processed, using theology and the life of Christian 
faith as a particular complement and not as the principle and foundation of existence263. 
Taylor has shown how the human being moves and is moved in the direction of places of 




religious experience to moralism that always tend to stay within the immanent framework and in 
the present sense.  On the one hand, the human being must adjust him/herself to “nature” and 
measure him/herself with a certain moral figure, stopping being open to the transcendence that 
manifests itself as a personal love that is received and given, that is transformative and that 
encourages us to continue gradually growing.  On the other hand, the eschatological collapse 
tends to reduce the future of reality to what is currently presented to us.  In this sense, there is no 
opening to a progressive transformation of the personal, social and ecological reality that opens 
up new possibilities, nor does it expect a different fullness from the current one.  The experience 
of a God who “makes all things new” (Rev 21:5b) (not who does new things), is lost264.  It is a 
great deal with the status quo. 
Furthermore, it is this type of moralism that seeks to impose itself in the public space, 
which annoys the young people who inhabit a culture of authenticity that promotes, in the first 
place, the personal search and spiritual choice.  The problem is not only that the Church proposes 
an individual ethic that does not make sense to them, which they experience as discriminating or 
distanced from their daily reality.  What this generation does not accept is that it be imposed on 
them by resorting to the argument of authority and also that it be established as a horizon of 
identity and/or collective membership.  A Church that presents itself in this way simply ceases to 
be heard and can easily be combated. It forgets that nobody falls in love in the first place with an 
institution, but with the cause that a community embraces as a horizon of significance.  As we 
have seen, this horizon, although institutionalized, requires being personally appropriated by the 
subject. 
Other feature that emerges from this collapse is that the incarnation of the Son of God 




of justice or as an admirable teacher.  And his words are reduced to a code to be applied to the 
reality that is expected to keep up with the final fulfillment, instead of being a personal and 
community call, first to participate in a relationship, and second, to grow in life towards that 
fullness of the Reign.  This is the subtle but erosive temptation that transforms the transcendent 
in a system that turns God into something clearly known and understood ones for all;  the subject 
then would no longer have the need to trust in God.  If he/she knows everything about God, 
somehow he she has managed to avoid God.  He/she forgets that the Judeo-Christian faith 
believes in the happening of God in Jesus of Nazareth whose story ends in his resurrection.  In 
eschatological terms, the resurrection of Jesus does not close the history of Jesus in the past, but 
opens a future of resurrection for all humanity and creation.  The Father himself, the Creator, is 
the one who resurrected Jesus and constitutes him as Lord, not in the way of a self-absorbed idol 
or an inert fetish, but as a life-giving Spirit (1Co 15:45;  2Co 3:17) that continues transforming 
the subject and history. 
Nevertheless, the eschatological images fall into disuse in the ecclesial community and 
they stop being part of their social imaginary.  The believing life, and therefore, the theology that 
wants to reflect on the experience of God of a community situated in time, ends up 
immanentizing transcendence in order to say something meaningful in the immanent frame 
instead of opening it.  We mute the eschatological historical process that is marked by the 
experience of being always unfinished, always on the way and always in a relationship of 
reciprocity between humanity and God, between what the human being does as a respondent to 
the force and the voice of the Agape that God communicates to him/her.  In this way, the 
narrative of our personal and community history loses reference to a larger narrative related to a 




give meaning and substance to our life265.  The Gospel is easily replaced by the canonical code, 
reinforced by institutions created for it.  The concrete people, their biographies and 
circumstances disappear in the normative rigidity, since no code can address all cases, nor 
adequately respond to crossroads where a plurality goods in dispute encounter.  The liturgy 
acquires a certain re-centering in the rubric or in the communication capacity of the celebrant.  
As a consequence, Christian Hope in a great final transformation that stresses our historical 
experience towards evangelical action, stops releasing its strength.  Rather, de facto, we live in 
an endless chronological time and no longer wait for the final resurrection to full joy that we 
have already begun to experience in some way.  We have become blind to transcendence. 
It is surprising that this type of moralism, with a certain fetish attitude towards rules and 
codes, is a characteristic of modernity.  And that many in the Church use the same scheme to 
combat modernity that they interpret as facing a great moral crisis.  They forget or have become 
blind to see that Christianity does not have a law that is directly related to religion;  it doesn’t 
offer a law that concretely tells to people what to do.  Christianity is a faith, not a law;  it can’t be 
laid out in a code or a fully-specified life form.  It is a faith in a transcendent presence that relates 
personally to the human being, communicating with him/her, participating him/her in His/Her 
transforming Agape and mobilizing him/her towards fuller ways of life that need to be discerned. 
If we listen to what the same young Catholics in Chile say about their faith experience, 
the similarities are surprising.  According the information provided by the field study on youth of 
the Church in Santiago de Chile, in religious terms, the youth horizon shows a strong immanent 
approach.  “We have realized that we can make the social change that we want, that we do not 
need Jesus Christ.  Jesus has been losing his divinity.  He is no longer as sacred as before”.  “He 




is faith that gives youngsters and society the possibility to certain people to find meaning for 
their existences and it is something in which they can find support, trust, vent at all times in the 
difficult struggle of wanting to help others and to find a job, some economic stability, welfare 
and take care of their own family.  But it is striking that the hope of most young Catholics from 
Santiago has an immanent and intramundane horizon.  Only occasionally they affirm that faith 
gives certainty about life after death and they never resort to the eschatological categories of the 
Christian tradition.  Likewise, the need for grace is not part of their narrative and they make few 
references to the need for spiritual practices such as prayer or liturgy.  “I believe in myself, I 
believe in my own abilities.  I know I can”266. 
Welcome to the times of authenticity in an immanent frame! 
 
…a letter to Diogneto 
Aided by the lenses of Charles Taylor we have tried to understand the hermeneutical 
structure of the human being.  This has shown us that one of the conditions of possibility to 
acquire an authentic personal identity is the reception, from a linguistic community of belonging 
where we are recognized, of a value framework that allows us to articulate and make qualitative 
distinctions about the most important goods that make life worthwhile.  Now, in an increasingly 
plural and open context, there is no single collectively shared framework.  Therefore, the search 
for a credible framework will always be the search for a meaning and end in life. 
Moreover, all of us, believers and non-believers alike, live in an immanent frame that 
threatens us with the meaninglessness of time.  Our narrative structure reminds us that as human 




ask ourselves what moral source –if nature, if God, if the dignity of our reason, if the will to 
power– associated with that place of fulfillment that we seek, sustains it and makes it viable.  In 
addition, we are always haunted by the question of whether we are right. 
The Christian community lives within the immanent framework but open to a personal 
and community relationship with the transcendence that we experience and point out as Agape.  
We understand it as a type of transforming love that humanizes us, that is, making us capable of 
establishing gratuitous reciprocal relationships, that overcome evil and whose fullness ends up 
being realized beyond history.  This framework requires a new language so that it can make 
sense to a generation of young people who were born in a plural world without language for the 
transcendent.  We need to rework the narrative articulation of the qualitative evaluations that 
form that horizon of significance that orients towards a place of fullness.  In this way, the new 
generations will be able to place their personal narratives in a greater narrative that offers a 
liberating and humanizing meaning in an understandable and pertinent language for what they 
live daily.  For, we live in language (corporal, symbolic, spoken, etc.) and through it we can open 
ourselves to a daily and transformative relationship with the transcendent.  Through it we can 
open ourselves and relate our life to the final meaning of history, trusting in the transcendent and 
experiencing its strength.  This is a condition of possibility for an eschatological mystique in the 
age of authenticity. 
Mysticism as an existential relationship with the transcendent God that communicates 
Her/His transforming Agape in history, responds to the moralistic dimension of the collapse that 
we have described.  The human being is structurally oriented towards a hypergood and is 
constantly becoming in a situated way in time towards more complete ways of being.  This 




value framework and horizon of significance, etc.) as a moral force, which enables a humanizing 
transforming process (theosis) and the shaping of a personal and collective identity in strong 
sense.  Likewise, the Christian life as an eschatological life offers a place of fullness that without 
losing reference to daily life is lucid about the need for transformation of reality to overcome its 
brokenness, a process that ends up being carried out beyond history.  It is the horizon of 
significance of the Reign of God or The New Heavens and the New Earth that responds to the 
historical dimension of the described collapse, the one that is unable to respond adequately to the 
experience of evil and that produce a sense of meaninglessness of ordinary life. 
Eschatological mysticism is the transformation and humanization of the human being that 
opens up him/herself to the transcendent in the immanent, facing the reality crossed by 
brokenness with hope. 
This implies, on the one hand, a transformation of the framework in which we Christians 
think, feel and live in a secular age.  And on the other, that we accept that for today’s culture, 
where all inhabit the immanent frame, our framework opened to the transcendent and that gives 
us our identity, is something strange, foreign, that makes us experience the world in a different 
way.  However, even in the midst of doubts, this contrast allows us to experience with greater 
sharpness the differential position of the interpretation of our vital orientation living within an 
immanent frame, and that we can offer it to others. 
I am hopeful that if someone comes into contact with the Christian community and writes 
to a friend, just as the author of a 2nd century letter wrote to his friend Diogneto: 
Christians are not distinguished from other men, neither by the place in which 
they live, nor by their language, nor by their customs.  Indeed, they do not have their 
own cities, nor do they use unusual speech, nor do they lead a different kind of life.  




studious men, nor do they profess, like others, a teaching based on the authority of 
men. 
They live in Greek and barbarian cities, according to their luck, they follow 
the customs of the country’s inhabitants, both in dress and in their entire lifestyle, and 
yet they show signs of an admirable tenor of life and, in their opinion of all, 
incredible.  They live in their own homeland, but as outsiders;  they take part in 
everything as citizens, but they bear it all as foreigners;  all foreign land is home to 
them, but they are in all homeland as in foreign land.  Like everyone, they marry and 
engender children, but they do not get rid of the children they conceive. They have the 
table in common, but not the bed. 
They live in the meat, but not according to the meat.  They live on earth, but 
their citizenship is in Heaven.  They obey the established laws, and with their way of 
living they overcome these laws.  They love everybody, and everybody pursue them.  
They are condemned without knowing them.  They are killed, and thereby receive life.  
They are poor, and enrich many;  they lack everything, and abound in everything.  
They suffer dishonor, and it serves them as glory;  they suffer detriment to their fame, 
and this testifies to their justice.  They are cursed, and they bless; they are treated with 
ignominy, and they, in return, return honor. 
[…] 
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1 The background understanding taken in a broader way is what Taylor calls social imaginary.  Different 
from an intellectual system or framework, “broader and deeper that the intellectual schemes people may entertain 
when they think about social reality in a disengaged mode [proper of modern sciences, a social imaginary is] the 
ways [ordinary] people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between 
them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that 
underlie these expectations. […] The social imaginary is that common understanding that makes possible common 
practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy”, enabling us to carry out those collective practices, as a common 
repertory, that make up our social life.  For instance, the rite of voting in an election, or organizing a massive social 
protest.  This way of imagining their social surroundings is often not expressed in theoretical terms;  it is carried in 
images, stories and legends, etc., and are shared by large groups of people if not by the entire society.  Moreover, 
“such understandings is both factual and normative;  that is, we have a sense of how they usually go, but this is 
interwoven with an idea of how they ought to go, of what missteps would invalidate the practice”.  Cf. Charles 
Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham: Public Planet Books, 2003), 23-24. 
2 See:  «Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública N° 84, Diciembre 2019 - Centro de Estudios Públicos», 
https://www.cepchile.cl, accessed January 29th 2020, https://www.cepchile.cl/cep/encuestas-cep/encuestas-2009-
2018/estudio-nacional-de-opinion-publica-n-84-diciembre-2019. and  «Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública, 
Octubre-Noviembre 2018 - Centro de Estudios Públicos», https://www.cepchile.cl, accessed februray 12th 2020, 
https://www.cepchile.cl/cep/encuestas-cep/encuestas-2009-2018/estudio-nacional-de-opinion-publica-octubre-
noviembre-2018. 
3 There is a stubborn Chilean inequality that, although it has diminished somewhat, has already been 
normalized.  In Chile the Gini Inequality Index was 0.57 respect to autonomous income in 1989 at the end of the 
dictatorship and has maintained around 0, 502 since 2017.  This brutal inequality makes most people live in Chile 
with fear of getting sick, getting old or losing their jobs.  This situation is reflected in the 82% of people that have 
incomes lower than the national average, $800 approx.  The 10% of the population with the highest income erns 37 
times more than the 10% with the lowest income.  According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (CEPAL), dependent on the UN, in 2017, 50% of the lowest-income households had 2.1% of the 
country’s net wealth, 10% concentrated 66.5% of the total and the wealthier 1% concentrated 26.5% of Chilean 
wealth. Cf. UN - CEPAL, Panorama Social de América Latina 2018 (Santiago de Chile, 2019), 62-63. 
4 For instance, as the Chilean historian and theologian María Soledad Del Villar Tagle collects (see: «Chile 
Despertó:  Sociopolitical Discernment from Open, Wounded, and Gifted Eyes» (unpublished manuscript, December 
2019), typescript) economic abuses through “the monopolistic tendencies [characteristic of capital accumulation] of 
the neoliberal economic systems, manifested in collusions among the owner of different companies to maintain high 
prices (of medicines, chicken meat and toilette paper, among other products)” weakening the free competition that 
they proclaim and strengthening the concentration of capital illegally, or in tax avoidance and evasion, or in the use 
of privileged information in transactions and businesses.  “Second, politicians from all parties and ideological 
tendencies have [received financing] from big companies [in exchange of] elaborating laws and policies that favor 
the economic elites and their business interests” (fishing, mining, forestry, real estate business, among others).  As a 
result, the congress is one of the least reliable institutions for Chileans who perceive it “as an institution that defends 
the interests and pockets of the owners of big companies rather than the interests [and life] of the common people.  
Third, corruption and misuse of public money are present [both in] government agents and in all the branches of the 
Army and the Police. Fourth, the Catholic Church, an institution that was trusted and admired because of its 
commitment in the defense of Human Rights during the dictatorship [of Pinochet (1973-1990)], has fallen into 
discredit after a deep crisis derived from sexual abuse scandals” and cover-ups.  Most of “these “white-collar” 
crimes have remained in impunity” or have received economic and moral penalties but never jail because of 
“deficient laws that punish harshly the crimes of the poor but are lax when crimes are committed by the rich and 
powerful”. 
I am grateful for the suggestion of María Soledad Del Villar Tagle on bibliography to go deeper:  the studies 
of CIPER Chile, a center of independent research journalism, leaded by Mónica Gonzalez (2019 national journalism 
award in Chile) and one of the few sources of serious research on corruption in Chile. Their best articles are 




                                                                                                                                                       
Catalonia, Ediciones UDP, 2010).;  Mónica González y Centro de Investigación Periodística, Lo mejor de CIPER 2. 
El periodismo que remece a Chile (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Catalonia, Ediciones UDP, 2013);  Mónica 
González y Centro de Investigación Periodística, Lo mejor de CIPER 3. El periodismo que remece a Chile (Santiago 
de Chile: Editorial Catalonia, Ediciones UDP, 2016). 
5 «UNDP | Human Development Report 2019», UNDP | Human Development Report 2019, accessed January 
26th 2020, http://report.hdr.undp.org/. 
6 Chile lived under a bloody civil-military dictatorship between September 11th, 1973 and March 11th, 1990. 
7 Chile, along with South Korea, leads the sustained increase in the suicide rate among young people.  Cf. 
Gabriel Guajardo Soto, ed., Suicidios contemporáneos:  vínculos, desigualdades y transformaciones socioculturales. 
(Santiago, Chile: FLACSO - Chile, 2017).  Orieta Echávarri et al., «Aumento Sostenido del suicidio en Chile», 
Políticas Públicas UC:  Temas de la Agenda Pública, año 10, n° 79 (junio de 2015). 
8 In 1992, 78% of people between 18 and 24 years old identified themselves with Catholicism and 7,2% did 
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Latinoamericano y del Caribe en Aparecida: Documento Conclusivo, ed. Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano, 3a 
ed. §26 (Santiago, Chile: Conferencia Episcopal de Chile, 2007), 49. 
13  María Soledad Del Villar Tagle, «Chile Despertó:  Sociopolitical Discernment from Open, Wounded, and 




                                                                                                                                                       
14 As Del Villar Tagle recalls (ibid), the Chilean Bishops Conference, leaded by Cardinal Raúl Silva 
Henriquez, created “the Vicaría de la Solidaridad, Vicariate of Solidarity, where victims of political violence and 
their families could receive human, legal and economic assistance.  [It] worked closely with parochial and Christian 
Base Communities to provide health care to the poor, organizing soup kitchens, create workshop for the unemployed 
and give education and recreation opportunities for children”.  Documents, photographic and audiovisual files in:  
«La Vicaría de la Solidaridad (1973-1992) - Memoria Chilena», Memoria Chilena: Portal, accessed January 24th, 
2020, http://www.memoriachilena.gob.cl/602/w3-article-3547.html. 
15 Del Villar. 
16 Within the vast literature on the role of the Chilean Catholic Church during the dictatorship, see the 
following texts.  The first offers an approach from political science, the second from theological reflection and the 
third from lived testimonies.  Pamela Lowden, Moral Opposition to Authoritarian Rule in Chile, 1973-90 (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995).  William T. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics, and the Body 
of Christ, (Oxford, UK ; Malden, Mass: Wiley-Blackwell, 1998).  Patricio Guzmán, En nombre de Dios, 
Documentary (Atacama Productions, París., 1987), https://www.patricioguzman.com/es/peliculas/en-nombre-de-
dios. 
17 Del Villar. 
18 Del Villar. 
19 Del Villar. 
20 Del Villar. 
21 Given the unusual prestige that the Chilean Church had at that time, as a result of the heroic defense of 
human rights during the dictatorship, the letter was received with a certain degree of respect, but fundamentally its 
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that he/she makes according to the standards of evidence (Descartes) or universalization (Kant).  Charles Taylor, 
Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1989), Part II: Inwardness. 111-209. 
40 Taylor thinks that this powerful moral ideal of authenticity is at work and widespread in our times and has 
grown particularly strong in Western societies since the 1960’s.  More and more people think that they ought to act 
like this, with the impression that they would waste or unfulfill their lives if they don’t. 
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